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The influence of the plea bargaining system on innocent defendants is fiercely debated. 
Many scholars call for a ban on plea bargaining, arguing that the practice coerces 
innocent defendants to plead guilty. Proponents of plea bargaining respond that even an 
innocent defendant is better off when he choose to plea bargain in order to assure a 
lenient result, if he concludes that the risk of wrongful trial conviction is too high. They 
claim that since plea bargaining is only an option, it cannot harm the defendant whether 
he is guilty or innocent. This paper argues that the both supporters and opponents of plea 
bargaining overlook its most important effect on innocent defendants: its effect on 
prosecutorial screening.  
 
When plea bargaining is available, prosecutors can extract a guilty plea in nearly every 
case, including very weak cases, simply by adjusting the plea concession to the 
defendant’s chances of acquittal at trial. When almost every case results in a plea of 
guilty, regardless of the strength of the evidence, prosecutors have much less interest in 
screening away weak cases. Since some cases are weak because the defendant is 
innocent, however, more innocent defendants are charged and as a result more are 
convicted.  
 
When the screening process is taken into account, there is no reason to believe that 
innocent defendants gain from plea bargaining. Yet, a total ban on plea bargaining is not 
the optimal response to the system’s deficiencies – and not only because such a ban 
would be unsustainable in an overloaded criminal justice system. A better response 
would be a partial  ban on plea bargaining, meaning a system that only prohibits plea 
bargains when the concession offered to the defendant in return for his guilty plea is 
large. With plea concessions restricted in such a way, defendants with relatively high 
chances of acquittal at trial would refuse to plea bargain. That way, prosecuting a weak 
case would usually result in a trial while a strong cases would be disposed through plea 
bargaining. Since prosecution resources do not allow for a high trial rate, prosecutors will 
be forced to refrain from bringing weak cases in order to direct scarce resources to 
stronger cases that can be settled. A partial ban therefore encourages prosecutors to 
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Very few issues in the American criminal justice system generate such fierce controversy 
as plea bargaining1 - and very few allegations against the practice are as severe as the 
assertion that it leads to the conviction of innocent defendants.2 Controversy over the 
“innocence problem”3 takes a leading role in today’s plea bargaining debate.  
Opponents to the plea bargaining system argue that the practice is inherently 
dangerous to innocent defendants. A defendant might plead guilty, not because he is 
guilty, but because the prosecutor offers some concession in return. Even an innocent 
defendant may rationally prefer a specified lenient sentence to the risk of a much harsher 
sentence resulting from a wrongful conviction at trial. Based on this argument, some 
                                                 
1 For few of the more noticeable exchanges of articles on the subject, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal 
Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Criminal 
Procedure as a Market System]; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory 
System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, (1988) [here inafter Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion]; Robert E. 
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as a Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992) [hereinafter Scott & 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as a Contract]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1969 (1992); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992) 
[hereinafter Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster]; Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-
Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1361 (2003) [hereinafter Bibas, Harmonizing Values]; Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at 
Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412 
(2003); Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values Into A Flawed Plea-Bargaining System 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1425 (2003).  
2 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining , 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 60 (1968) 
[hereinafter Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining] (arguing that “the greatest pressure to 
plead guilty are brought to bear on defendants who may be innocent”); C. RONALD HUFF & ARYE 
RATTNER, CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT : WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 73-74 (1996) 
(arguing that “many innocent defendants are convicted after entering guilty pleas”); John H. Langbein, 
Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 15 (1978) (arguing that plea bargaining is an unreliable 
process because the resulting guilty pleas are coerced). See also  Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 
supra  note 1, at 1981-87. 
3 For a discussion on the innocence problem in plea bargaining, see Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as 
Disaster, supra  note 1, at 1981; Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as a Contract, supra note 1, at 1949. For 
an overview of the arguments, see F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargaining and 
Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. 
L. 189 (2002).  
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opponents conclude that plea bargaining should be prohibited.4 Others, recognizing the 
impracticality of such a prohibition, suggest milder remedies.5 
Supporters of the plea bargaining system claim that the above argument ignores 
the crux of the practice. Plea agreements are not forced on defendants, supporters note - 
they are only an option. Innocent defendants are likely to reject this option because they 
expect an acquittal at trial. Of course, sometimes even an innocent defendant faces a risk 
of conviction. The prosecutor might gather evidence that could lead to his wrongful 
conviction in a jury trial. In such a case, the innocent defendant might prefer the more 
lenient outcome that results from a guilty plea. Even in this case, however, plea 
bargaining is the least aggravating alternative. Prohibiting plea bargaining for the 
innocent defendant forces him to face the high risk of a jury trial conviction. But since he 
would have chosen the plea bargain, one could fairly assume that he thinks that the risk 
                                                 
4 For calls for a total ban on plea bargaining, see Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal 
Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 937-48 
(1983) [hereinafter Alschuler, Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System] (arguing that our society should 
bear the cost needed to assure that every felony defendant receives a jury trial); John H. Langbein, Land 
Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 225 (1979) (calling to learn from 
countries that manage not to rely on plea bargaining); Jeff Palmer, Note: Abolishing Plea Bargaining: An 
End to The Same Old Song and Dance, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 505 (1999); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea 
Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining 
Inevitable?] (arguing that instead of inducing defendants to waive their right to trial, defendants can be 
encouraged to waive their right for a jury while still having a bench trial); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, 
The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31 (2002) [hereinafter Wright & Miller, 
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff] (arguing that rigorous prosecutorial screening of cases should serve as an 
alternative to plea bargains).  
5 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2527-28 (2004) 
[hereinafter Bibas, Outside the Shadow of Trial] (arguing that although the plea bargaining system is 
flawed, it is impractical to abolish it, and thus one should consider milder revisions); Douglas D. 
Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really "Ban" Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining 
Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 781 (1998) (“The concerns of plea bargaining critics--the corruption of 
institutional values, the decreased effectiveness of criminal sanctions, and the increased chance of improper 
convictions--can be remedied through regulation of the plea bargaining process.”). 
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of a guilty verdict at trial is too high. Thus, forcing the innocent defendant to go to trial 
would be against his best interests.6  
Both the opponents and supporters of plea bargaining miss the essence of the 
innocence problem. The danger that plea bargaining poses to innocent defendants is not 
rooted in the practice of plea bargaining itself. Instead, the innocence problem is the 
result of the practice’s effect on the prosecutor’s screening decisions.7  
When plea bargaining is available, the prosecutor can reach a guilty plea in almost 
every case, even a very weak one. When the case is weak, meaning, when the probability 
that a trial would result in conviction is relatively small, she can assure a conviction by 
offering the defendant a substantial discount – a discount big enough to compensate him 
for foregoing the possibility of being found not guilty. Knowing that gaining convictions 
in weak cases is not difficult, the prosecutor cares less about the strength of the cases she 
brings. As a result, she is more likely to prosecute weak cases where defendants are more 
likely to be innocent.  
Given that the innocent defendant is prosecuted, he might realize that he is better 
off accepting a plea bargain offer. At that stage, the offer cannot harm him. The point is 
that the defendant would have been much better off if the prosecutor had not been able to 
                                                 
6 See Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of "Bargain Justice,"  13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 509, 516 (1979);  
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent 
Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 2013 (1992) [hereinafter Scott & Stuntz, Imperfect Bargains]; Two 
proponents of the practice have even suggested that we do not need to encourage innocent defendants to 
reject plea bargain offers but, on the contrary, we need to assure that innocent defendants get better offers - 
offers that they are less likely to reject. Id. See also  Scott & Stuntz, Plea Barganing as a Contract, supra 
note 1, at 1956-57 (suggesting that judges should not be allowed to increase sentences beyond the 
prosecutors’ recommendation, because that might make plea bargain offers less attractive to innocent 
defendants and would encourage them to opt for a risky trial instead of a plea bargain). 
7 By screening decision, I mean the process by which prosecutors decide which cases should be dismissed 
unconditionally and which should be pursued in court. 
7
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offer him a plea bargain in the first place because then she probably would not have 
charged him at all.  
Therefore, solving the innocence problem requires discouraging the prosecution 
of weak cases. A total ban on plea bargaining, however, would only be partially effective 
– at best - in achieving that goal. As many scholars have shown, a total ban on plea 
bargaining is hardly feasible in the overloaded American criminal justice system.8 But 
even if it was possible, there are other reasons to look for alternate solutions to the 
innocence problem. A total ban would force trials in all cases, making all cases, weak and 
strong, more expensive to prosecute. As a result, prosecutors would be forced to process 
fewer cases, but not necessarily the stronger ones.  
The best way to cope with the innocence problem is to allow plea bargaining only 
in strong cases and to ban plea bargaining in weak cases. Such a “partial ban” on plea 
bargains would allow prosecutors to extract guilty pleas when defendants are almost 
certainly guilty, while forcing them to conduct jury trials when they bring more 
questionable charges. As a result, the portion of weak cases pursued by prosecutors 
would decrease substantially.  
Like a total ban, a partial ban would force prosecutors to face the high risk of 
losing each weak case they bring to trial. But unlike a total ban, the alternative to 
                                                 
8 See Bibas, Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra  note 5, at 2527 (arguing that abolishing plea bargaining is 
impractical); Guidorizzi, supra note 5, at 776 (“Alaska’s experience demonstrates the difficulty in 
maintaining a complete, long-term ban on plea bargaining.”). For additional references, see WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, 5 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1(g) (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 
2005). This is also the position of the Supreme Court. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 
(1971) (“If every charge were subject to full trial, the states and federal government would need to multiply 
by many times the number of judges and court facilities.”). Still, some scholars insist that plea bargaining 
can be abolished. See Alschuler, Alternatives to the Plea Bargain System, supra note 3, at 936 [hereinafter 
Alschuler, Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System] (arguing that “the United States could provide three 
days jury trials to all felony defendants who reach the trial stage” by adding the necessary resources); 
Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, supra  note 4, at 1107 (arguing that instead of encouraging 
guilty pleas, defendants should be encouraged to choose bench trials that save resources while still assure 
fair adversarial hearings). 
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prosecuting the weak case is much more attractive. With their overloaded docket, 
prosecutors can replace one weak case with a few strong cases, since the latter will 
usually be disposed of by an inexpensive plea bargain as opposed to a costly jury trial. In 
addition, unlike a total ban, with a partial ban in place prosecutors would know that 
strong cases will result in a guilty plea, making convictions almost certain. Because 
prosecutors dislike losing at trial, this is a supplementary incentive to prefer strong cases 
to weak ones.  
How would this partial ban work? It is, admittedly, difficult for courts to directly 
evaluate the strength of a case. One might argue that not knowing which cases are weak, 
courts would not be able to implement such a partial ban. The purpose of this Article is to 
show that a partial ban can be implemented without requiring courts to directly review 
the strength of the cases. Courts only have to reject plea bargains that result in substantial 
concessions.  
Usually, prosecutors could not obtain a guilty plea in weak cases unless they offer 
substantial concessions. When a defendant knows he has a good chance for acquittal at 
trial, he will only plead guilty in return for considerable leniency. Therefore, the disparity 
between the expected sentence after a trial conviction and the bargained-for sentence 
signals the strength of the case. When the plea bargain leads to an exceptionally lenient 
sentence, the guilty plea should be rejected.  
With such a rule in place, prosecutors will know they can only obtain a guilty plea 
in strong cases. This will encourage them to screen away weak cases where defendants 
are more likely to be innocent. Therefore, this rule will mitigate the innocence problem 
while allowing a fast disposition of the majority of cases through plea bargaining.  
9
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Surprisingly, the extensive literature on plea bargaining overlooks the screening 
effect of the partial ban. A number of scholars notice that weak cases often result in 
substantial plea bargain concessions.9 Some have even suggested restricting guilty plea 
concessions to a limited and fixed sentence discount, in order to encourage innocent 
defendants to opt for a trial. 10 These suggestions have some similarities to this Article’s 
proposal for a partial ban. Yet, they usually overlook the most important feature of the 
limitation on sentence concessions – its effect on prosecutorial screening decisions.  
The advocates of a fixed sentence discount propose the limitation in order to 
assure that weak cases result in a jury trial. This Article’s argument is different. I believe 
that forcing innocent defendants to face a jury trial cannot protect them. Yet, limiting plea 
bargains is justified in order to reduce the risk that innocent defendants will face 
prosecution in the first place.11 
 The remainder of the Article is organized as follows: Part I presents the current 
state of the plea bargaining debate, focusing on the controversy over the effects of plea 
bargaining on the risk of wrongful convictions. Later in this Part, the focus is redirected 
                                                 
9 See infra  notes 24-30 and accompanying text . 
10 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining (pt. 1), 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 
1127, 1065 (1976) [hereinafter Alschuler, Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining] (supporting a fixed 
discount system for guilty pleas in order to ensure that weak cases would result in a trial); Guidorizzi, supra  
note 5, at 782 (suggesting that the plea bargaining process be replaced by a system that relies on fixed 
written sentencing discounts); Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra  note 1, at 2004-05; James 
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1560-61 (1981) (suggesting 
“a relatively modest, prescribed sentencing concession of ten or twenty percent of the sentence received for 
a guilty plea” to encourage defendants with a good defense to exercise their right to trial); Ronald F. 
Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Law, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Fall 2005) (manuscript at 34, on file with author) (arguing for “practices that offer only 
modest plea discounts to defendants” in order to increase the confidence in criminal convictions). 
11 Because my goal is different then the goals of the fixed discount advocates, there are also differences in 
the content of the proposal. For example, supporters of the fixed sentence discount rarely explain why they 
chose a specific percentage of sentence discount. What I am suggesting here is to tailor the allowed 
sentence reduction to the goal of discouraging the prosecution of cases in which reasonable doubt exists. 
See footnotes 136-140 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the partial ban does not require a fixed 
sentence discount. The sentence discount can vary from case to case as long as the sentence concession is 
not bigger than allowed.  
10
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from the bargaining process to the prosecutors’ choice of cases. Part II compares the 
effects of three alternative systems: the existing plea bargaining system, a system with a 
total ban on plea bargaining and the partial ban system. This Part demonstrates a partial 
ban’s superiority to the two alternative systems in discouraging the prosecution of weak 
cases and in protecting innocent defendants. Part III reviews the justifications for 
encouraging prosecutors to screen away weak cases. Here, it is examined whether it is 
socially desirable to discourage plea bargains in weak cases, especially since the 
difficulties in proving some of these cases result from the existing rules of procedure and 
evidence and not because the defendants’ guilt is at doubt. This part also analyzes the 
effects of potential differences in the parties’ evaluation of the evidence on the partial 
ban. Finally, Part IV discusses the implementation of the partial ban, with reference to 
different types of plea bargaining including sentence bargaining, charge bargaining, 
judicial plea bargaining and cooperation agreements. This Part also sets the criterion for 
the level of concessions that should be allowed in plea bargaining.  
I. Plea Bargaining and the Innocence Problem 
Much of the plea bargaining controversy revolves around the innocence problem. 
This Part will review the current stage of the debate, which focuses on the dilemma of the 
innocent defendant after being charged. Then, it will address the effects of plea 
bargaining on prosecutors’ screening decisions.  
11
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A.  The Plea Bargaining Debate 
Plea bargaining is rationalized just like any other legal settlement.12 Whether 
guilty or innocent, the defendant knows he might be convicted at trial. Taking into 
account the post-trial sentence and the probability of conviction, he determines his 
“highest acceptable sentence.” The defendant will only be willing to plead guilty in return 
for a sentence lower than or equal to his highest acceptable sentence13. His consent 
assures that accepting a plea bargain is preferable to him than going to trial.  
Relying on the consensual nature of the practice, the Supreme Court and various 
scholars have praised plea bargaining as a process that benefits all participants in the 
criminal jus tice system as well as the public.14 Defendants can opt for a lower sentence 
than the one they risk at trial, prosecutors assure convictions and are able to prosecute 
more defendants, and the public benefits from an effective criminal justice system at a 
reasonable cost. 
To be sure, defendants might make mistakes while plea bargaining.15 They might 
accept offers they are better off rejecting or vice versa. This risk is especially high when 
                                                 
12 See Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as a Contract, supra note 1, at 1913 (proposing to regard plea 
bargaining as an exchange for entitlement to chances in trial); Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a 
Market System, supra note 1, at 309 (“If defendants and prosecutors (representing society) both gain, the 
process is desirable.”).  
13 See DEBRA S. EMMELMAN, JUSTICE FOR THE POOR – A STUDY OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE WORK 41 (2003) 
(Describing how defense lawyers value a case in deciding whether to accept a plea bargain based on the 
likely outcome at trial). 
14 See id. See also Church, supra  note 6, at 513-519; Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261 (“Disposition of charges 
after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many 
reasons. It leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the 
corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pre-trial confinement for those who are denied release 
pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct 
even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances 
whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.”). 
15 See Bibas, Outside of the Shadow of Trial, supra  note 5, at 2498-19 (describing different psychological 
biases that are likely to influence defendants’ perception of their options); Geoffrey R. McKee, 
Competency to Stand Trial in Preadjudicatory Juveniles and Adults, 26 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 89, 
96-97 (1998) (noting that teenage defendants may lack the capacity to understand plea bargaining). 
12
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 59 [2005]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art59
 12 
they do not receive adequate representation;16 and there are good reasons to believe that 
many defendants receive intolerably poor representation. 17  
One should not overlook, however, that mistakes and bad lawyering can damage 
defendants at trial too. While plea bargaining is a simple “give-and-take” process, a trial 
is much more complicated.18 Forcing a trial cannot solve the problems of a defendant 
represented by an incompetent lawyer.19 Similarly, lazy or overburdened defense 
attorneys who can misrepresent the defendant in plea bargaining would probably also 
cause similar damage by not investigating the case or not preparing properly for trial. 20 In 
fact, studies have shown that bad lawyering is one of the more significant reasons for 
wrongful convictions in jury trials.21 Thus it is very likely that abolishing plea bargaining 
would worsen the consequences of substandard representation. 22  
                                                 
16 For the most comprehensive presentation of the effects of bad lawyering in plea bargaining, see Albert 
W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining , 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1212 (1975). See also  
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra  note 1, at 1988-91 (describing the defense attorneys’ 
personal interest in plea bargaining); Bibas, Outside of the Shadow of Trial, supra  note 5, at 2476-78 
(describing why defenders might misrepresent defendants in plea bargaining). 
17 See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 
90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 221 (“ Year after year, in study after study, observers find remarkably poor defense 
lawyering that remains unchanged by [the constitutional doctrine of effective assistance of counsel], and 
they point to lack of funding as the major obstacle to quality defense lawyering.”); Richard Klein, The 
Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of 
Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST . L.Q. 625 (1986). 
18 See Scott & Stuntz, Plea Barganing as a Contract , supra  note 1, at 1933-34 (“[L]awyers' skill surely 
matters more in a trial than in a plea bargaining session.”). 
19 See id. See also  Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, supra  note 1, at 309 (“Conflicts of 
interest (agency costs) are as pressing throughout the criminal process as at the time of plea.”). 
20 See Gerald E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV 2117, 2123 
(1998) (“The poor and ill-represented may also fare badly at trial, where the lack of preparation or empathy 
of their lawyers, the prejudices of jurors, and the great resources of the state may equally secure an unjust 
conviction.”). 
21 See DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, infra note 32, at 183-97 (reviewing cases of bad defense lawyering at 
trial and stating that “studies by the Innocence Project found that 27% of the wrongfully convicted had 
subpar or outright incompetent legal help”); SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, INNOCENT : INSIDE WRONGFUL 
CONVICTION CASES 94 (2004) (“[I]neffective assistance of counsel greatly contribute to many wrongful 
convictions, especially because negligent representation by defense counsels allow many other kinds of 
errors, such as mistaken identification and eyewitness perjury, to occur unchallenged.”). 
22 See Bibas, Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra  note 5, at 2528 n. 295 (admitting that the abolition of plea 
bargaining could worsen the problems created by defendants’ biases and poor representation); see also  
Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as a Contract, supra  note 1, at 1933. Professor Schulhofer argues that if 
13
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That does not mean that policy makers should not try to minimize the risks of low 
quality representation and mistakes. A variety of measures to mitigate the problem are 
discussed in academic literature,23 and no doubt many of them should be seriously 
considered. But there is no reason to assume that an innocent defendant will be worse off 
if, in addition to trial, he is offered a plea bargain.  
Yet, it is argued that even if defendants make rationa l decisions, the plea 
bargaining system increases the risk of wrongful convictions. With plea bargaining, 
prosecutors can extract a guilty plea in almost any case, regardless of the real culpability 
of the defendant. They merely have to offer each defendant a settlement he prefers to 
trial.24 Only very rarely is the highest acceptable sentence of a defendant zero; even many 
innocent defendants are willing to accept minor punishment in return for avoiding the 
risk of a much harsher trial result.25 Therefore, prosecutors can extract guilty pleas even 
                                                                                                                                                 
plea bargaining is abolished, more money will be diverted to public defenders and thus reduce the 
incentives to act negligently. See Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra  note 1, at 2001-02. 
However, this argument is unconvincing. More money could certainly improve the quality of the 
defenders’ services. However, if a ban on bargaining accompanies the increase in resources, the new 
money will first have to be devoted to the new task of trying many more cases, before any of it will allow 
defenders to increase the needed efforts to prepare cases. Schulhofer seem to contend that a ban on 
bargaining will create the necessary political pressure to supply defendants with the appropriate means to 
defend themselves. Id. at 2002. However, when such political motives are considered, the ban is 
impractical anyway. No legislator will ban plea bargaining only in order to pressure itself to devote more 
resources to the public defender’s office. 
23 Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as a Contract, supra  note 1, at 1959-60 (arguing that defendants would 
be better protected from mistakes if judges use their power to impose lower sentences then the parties 
bargained for); Bibas, Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra  note 5, at 2531-45 (listing several adjustments 
that could reduce the risk of defendants’ mistakes); Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, 
Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and 
Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 122 (1993) (arguing that 
“present institutions for providing criminal defense ought to be replaced with a voucher system”). 
24 Wright, supra  note 10 (manuscript at 36, on file with author) (arguing that the discount offered in return 
for a guilty plea is often quite large, and thus induce guilty pleas in weak cases); Welsh S. White, A 
Proposal For Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 450-51 (1971) (“When a 
New York or Philadelphia assistant prosecutor has a case which he believes is weak, he will frequently 
offer large concessions to induce a guilty plea.”).  
25 See Langbein, supra  note 2, at 13. For example, when the prosecutor has a weak case against a defendant 
charged with rape, she can offer the defendant a guilty plea to simple battery. The defendant is very likely 
to accept the offer even if he is innocent. Professor Alschuler, in one of the most cited examples of the 
innocence problem, reported of a defendant in such a case. When his attorney told him that a conviction at 
14
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from defendants who are likely to be found not guilty at trial. Some scholars have shown 
that prosecutors often offer defendants a plea bargain that seems to be extremely 
favorable, when the culpability of the defendant is highly questionable.26  
A significant number of the recently discovered police misconduct scandals 
demonstrate that defendants might plead guilty when the trial sentence they face is much 
higher then the plea bargain sentence, even if they had nothing to do with the alleged 
offense.27 In other instances, innocent defendants pleaded guilty in order to avoid the risk 
                                                                                                                                                 
trial seems highly improbable, the defendant simply said “I can’t take the chance.” Alschuler, The 
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, supra  note 2, at 685. For some of the articles revisiting that example, 
see Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 
1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 46; Church, supra  note 6, at 515; Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea 
Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 685 (1981) [hereinafter Alschuler, Changing Plea Bargaining 
Debate]; Langbein, supra  note 2, at 13; Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea 86 
ETHICS 93, 98 (1976). See also  John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and 
Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 449 (2001) (“[The prosecutor] will offer greater sentencing 
concessions in those cases where conviction is less likely, and fewer concessions where she is more 
confident of conviction.”). 
26 Id. at 61 (citing an assistant district attorney in Pittsburg who described a practice in which charges in 
rape cases are reduced to fornication “when it seems likely that the complaining witness consented to the 
defendant’s advances”); Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1534-35 (explaining why prosecutors are likely to 
offer the greatest incentives for those defendants with the greatest chance of acquittal at trial); White, supra  
note 24, 451 (“According to Martin Erdman, New York prosecutors often reduce their sentence 
recommendations by at least fifty percent if they believe that there is a fifty percent chance of a hung jury, 
and by a great deal more if they believe that there is a fifty percent chance of acquittal.”).  
27 In the Rampart Scandal, officers in the Los Angeles Police Department had routinely lied in arrest report, 
leading to the convictions of scores of innocence defendants, many of whom pleaded guilty. See Erwin 
Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department's Board of Inquiry Report on 
the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 630 (2001) (arguing that the “Rampart [scandal] shows 
that there is enormous pressure on innocent individuals to plead guilty” and calling for a more serious 
excursive of the judicial responsibility to examine the factual basis for a guilty plea); Lou Cannon, One Bad 
Cop, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.1, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 32 (describing the Rampart scandal and the case of 
Rafael Zambrano, an innocent defendant who pleaded guilty to possession of gun to avoid a longer 
sentence); See also  Samuel R. Gross, Kristen Jacoby, Daniel Matheson, Nicholas Montgomery & Sujata 
Patil, Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 534 
(2005) (“ In the aftermath of this scandal, at least 100 criminal defendants who had been framed by Rampart 
CRASH officers—and possibly as many as 150—had their convictions vacated and dismissed by Los 
Angeles County judges in late 1999 and 2000. The great majority were young Hispanic men who had pled 
guilty to false felony gun or drug charges.”). In the Tulia scandal, 38 people in Tulia, Texas were convicted 
of drugs offenses based on the information of one dishonest deputy. While eight defendants were convicted 
at trial and were sentence to long imprisonment terms, the others pleaded guilty. See Leonard Post, Trouble 
in Tulia Still Resounds; As Trial Looms, Role of Solos Emerges, 26 NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL April 5, 
2004, No. 31; at 1 (describing attorney Holloway’s decision to advise his clients to enter a guilty plea, even 
though he knew that at least one of them is innocent, in order to reduce their exposure. The defendants 
pleaded guilty.); Karin Brulliard, Texas Governor Pardons 35 Convicted in Drug Sting , THE WASHINGTON 
POST , August 23, 2003, § A. at 2, (“The harsh sentences in the first several trials persuaded most of the 
15
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of capital punishment.28 While these cases have captured most of the public’s attention, 
they probably do not represent the whole phenomenon.  
Less noticeable are cases where the prosecutor’s favorable offer is aimed at 
assuring conviction when specific defenses, like insanity or self defense, might be 
established in court29, or when a favorable plea bargain can lead to a guilty plea even 
though the defendant has a reasonably good chance of showing that one of the elements 
of the offence, like lack of consent in a rape case, is absent. In all these cases, an innocent 
defendant might accept the offer in order to avoid the risk of a much harsher result if he is 
                                                                                                                                                 
other defendants to plead guilty.”). See Also  Dale Lezon, Judge declines to drop Robertson County, lawmen 
from rights suit, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, April 14, 2005 § B. at 4 (Reporting of 28 defendants that were 
arrested based on information from an informant, that was later found to be tempering with the evidence in 
this case. Five of the defendants pleaded guilty and received probation and later the cases against all the 
others were dismissed). 
28 See Gross et al., supra note 27, at 536 (reviewing 340 exonerations since 1989. In twenty cases the 
conviction resulted from a guilty plea, usually entered to avoid a death sentence or life imprisonment); 
Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 21, 63 (1987) (reviewing five cases in which innocent defendants pleaded guilty in order to avoid the 
risk of a death sentence); Diana Borteck, Pleas for DNA Testing: Why Lawmakers Should Amend State 
Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes to Apply to Prisoners Who Plead Guilty, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1429, 
1442-45 (2004) (describing cases of defendants who pleaded guilty to capital offenses they did not 
commit). See also  Huff et al., supra  2, at 73-74. On the constitutionality of plea bargaining in capital cases, 
see Joseph L. Hoffmann, Marcy L. Kahn & Steven W. Fisher, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Death, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2001). 
29 See Arnold Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, THE PRESIDENT 'S COMMISSION ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT : THE COURTS 114 (1967) (arguing that the 
intermediate sanction that results from plea bargaining is often fairer than the jury trial result because “the 
line between responsibility and irresponsibility due to insanity is not as sharp as a jury would suggest”). For 
other views, see John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or A Third "Model" of the Criminal 
Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 398-99 (1970) (arguing that if the defendant is not responsible, he should not be 
regarded as responsible through the use of guilty plea); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea 
Bargaining, supra  note 2, at 71 (arguing that instead of plea bargaining, the criminal law can be altered to 
allow courts to fit the result to the level of the defendant’s culpability). See also infra  Section III.A. 
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convicted at trial,30 and thereby plea bargaining could very well lead to the conviction of 
factually innocent defendants.31  
Proponents of the plea bargaining system do not question the fact that sometimes 
innocent defendants plead guilty. Their common reply is that forbidding plea bargaining 
would only make the defendants’ situation worse. Trials are not perfect, and defendants 
can be wrongly convicted in trials as well.32 When a defendant takes into account the 
probability of being falsely convicted and the severity of the post-trial sentence, he may 
decide he is better off pleading guilty to an offense he did not commit. Plea agreements 
thus serve as a type of insurance.33 One should not prevent innocent defendants from 
buying this type of insurance against a wrongful conviction at trial. 34 In other words, 
because the defendant can always opt for a trial, the innocent defendant can always 
choose the lesser evil between pleading guilty and gambling on a jury trial. Eliminating 
one of these admittedly grave options could only harm him.35  
 
                                                 
30 See White, supra  note 24, 451-52. If the defendant in a weak case, innocent or guilty, does not plead 
guilty he might still be convicted, and face a much harsher sentence. See supra  note 28; Alschuler, The 
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, supra note 2, at 62 (describing a few such cases, including one in 
which a defendant who rejected a five-year sentence in a weak murder case was convicted and sentenced to 
thirty-five years, and another in which a defendant was sentenced to death and executed after rejecting an 
offer to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter). 
31 Throughout most of the Article, in discussing innocence, I refer to factual innocence. An innocent 
defendant is a defendant whose action did not constitute an offence, or constitute a different and less severe 
offence then the one for which he was charged or convicted. Later, in Part III. C. I refer to what is 
sometimes loosely called “legal innocence”, meaning cases where the weakness of the case results from 
procedural rules and not from real doubts about the nature of the defendant’s behavior.  
32 See generally BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, TRIALS ERRORS AND MISCONDUCT  (1997). See also  JIM DWYER, 
PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE : FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER 
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000) (surveying dozens of wrongful conviction cases, 
almost all of which resulted from a jury trial); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L.  Radelet, Miscarriages of 
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 63 (1987) (reporting 350 cases of wrongful 
convictions in potentially capital cases, most of which resulted from a jury trial). 
33 Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 749, 
752 (1983); Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as a Contract, supra  note 1, at 1947. 
34 Scott & Stuntz, Imperfect Bargains, supra  note 6, at 2013. 
35 See Church, supra  note 6, at 516; Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as a Contract , supra  note 1, at 1960-
61, Enker, supra  note 29, at 113. 
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B. The Emphasis Shift – from Bargaining to Screening 
The innocence problem cannot be attributed to the bargaining process itself. 
Usually the offer to settle can only alleviate the awfulness of the innocent’s condition. 
His real problem is that he was prosecuted in the first place. In many cases, he was 
charged because of the availability of plea bargaining. The problem with the system is the 
effects of plea bargaining on the prosecutors’ choice of cases. Because of the availability 
of plea bargaining, the strength of evidence of any given case becomes less important to 
the prosecution. Defendants in weak cases are more likely to be charged – and therefore 
more likely to be convicted. With the strength of evidence playing a relatively small role 
in the result of the case, more innocent defendants are likely to be among those 
convicted.  
1. The Screening Mechanism 
To fully understand the effects of plea bargaining on screening decisions one must 
first focus on the factors affecting the screening policy when plea bargaining is not 
available. The majority of cases that reach most prosecutors’ offices never result in 
charges;36 each prosecutor must choose which cases she desires to pursue. Some cases are 
dismissed because she believes that they do not merit a criminal trial; these cases would 
be dismissed regardless of any resource constraints. She may feel that the defendant is 
innocent or, at least, that his guilt is too questionable to merit putting him at risk for 
                                                 
36 Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 251 (1980) (“[L]ess than one-fourth of the complaints received by U.S. 
Attorneys appear to result in the filing of formal charges.”);  Vorenberg, supra  note 10, at 1524 (“Studies 
indicate that only a minority of matters received by the prosecutor result in charges.”); LaFave, Israel & 
King, supra  note 8, §13.2(a) (stating that even though the police conducts much of the screening in the state 
level, “the number of cases which reach the prosecutor but do not result in prosecution can be substantial”). 
Obviously this extensive screening exists when plea bargaining is allowed; without it, even fewer cases will 
be prosecuted. 
18
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 59 [2005]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art59
 18 
conviction. Alternatively, she can conclude that the violation, though provable, is not 
severe enough to justify the criminal stigma. Other factors regarding the defendant, 
victim, offense, public interest, political repercussion of the case and the prosecutor’s 
personal interest, might also lead to the dismissal of particular cases. Those cases that 
remain after this screening process are those that the prosecutor believes she should 
pursue. But often the complexity of the criminal process and her limited resources allow 
for prosecution of only a subgroup of these cases.37  
How does the prosecutor decide among these remaining cases? Analyzing the 
effects of all possible factors is quite complicated. The prosecutor’s policy regarding plea 
bargains, her screening policies, and the defendants’ decisions are all strongly 
interrelated.  To explore this issue, this Article will first use a few simplified assumptions 
about the ways prosecutors make decisions. Later, in following sections, those 
assumptions will be relaxed.  
The three major factors that are likely to affect prosecutors are the conviction’s 
value, the probability of conviction and the cost of trying the case. The conviction’s value 
is the value the prosecutor attaches to convicting the defendant and is influenced 
primarily by the severity of the offense.38  For example, a conviction in a minor 
embezzlement case is probably much less valuable to the prosecutor than a conviction in 
a rape or murder case. Value attached to a conviction might also be influenced by such 
                                                 
37 See JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 65 (1980) (“Regardless of 
other considerations – policy, quality, or external constraints – screening is an effective start on the road to 
caseload reduction”).   
38 The term severity refers here to all the factors that make an action more blameworthy, including the 
defendant’s criminal history, the consequences of the offense and other relevant factors.  
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factors as the prosecutor’s interest in alleviating the suffering of a crime victim, her 
personal feelings toward each defendant or political considerations.39  
I will first assume that the prosecutor’s decision is not substantially restricted by 
grand jury review or preliminary hearings and that her objective is to maximize the 
number of convictions weighted by their respective values, leaving a more complex 
analysis of her motives and powers for a later stage.40 Therefore, the prosecutor will 
prefer cases that yield a higher expected value per unit of resources, where the expected 
value is the conviction’s value discounted by the probability of conviction.  
One can imagine the prosecutor grading each case according to its expected value 
per resources, listing the cases according to their grades and then taking as many cases as 
possible from the top of the list.41 That analysis can explain why prosecutors occasionally 
bring weak cases, even though they cannot afford to try all of the available strong cases. 
When the conviction’s value of a weak case is high enough the prosecutor might prefer it 
to a stronger one because the potential gains more than offsets the increased risk.  
                                                 
39 See Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion, supra  note 1, at 50; Vorenberg, supra  note 10, at 1526-27.  
40 See Part II B. for a more complete analysis of the prosecutor’s considerations in screening and Part III D. 
for the discussion of the effects of grand juries and preliminary hearings. It is sometimes assumed that the 
prosecutor tries to maximize the number of conviction weighted by their respective post-conviction 
sentences. See William M. Landes, An Economics Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 61, 63 
(1971); Scott and Stuntz, supra  note 1, at 1936. The prosecutor would probably be influenced by the 
severity of the sentence in determining the conviction’s value in each case. Yet, I use a more general 
assumption that recognizes other factors’ influences on prosecutorial preference. Several scholars assume 
that prosecutors want to maximize deterrence or in some other way maximize social welfare. See Church, 
supra  note 6, at 518-19; Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, supra  note 1, 295-96; 
Grossman & Katz, supra note 33, at 750. This can also be accommodated in the formula above by 
assuming that the prosecutor assigns values to each conviction according to the effect of the conviction on 
deterrence or another social interest.  







= Where Gt is the grade of the case at trial, 
Vt, is the value of a trial conviction, P the probability of conviction and Rt the resources needed for a trial 
The indicator t refers to trial as opposed to settlement. 
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2. The Effect of the Increased Capacity on the Innocence Problem  
Introducing plea bargaining might influence the prosecutor’s choice of cases in 
various ways. Most importantly, it substantially reduces the resources needed for each 
case.42 Plea bargains are not only cheaper than trials, they are much cheaper.43 If absent 
plea bargaining the prosecutor can pursue a certain group of defendants (Group A), with 
plea bargaining she can prosecute a much larger group of defendants (Group B). 
Naturally, as the number of total prosecutions rises, so will the number of prosecuted 
innocents.44 However, it is not the number, but the proportion of innocent defendants that 
matters. Reducing the number of wrongful prosecutions just by reducing the number of 
prosecutions makes no more sense than arbitrarily exonerating a random number of 
inmates, since some of them are likely to be innocent. The fact that Group B is bigger 
cannot justify a preference for Group A. 45  
Thus, the important question is whether the proportion of innocent defendants in 
Group B is higher than in Group A. Contrary to the argument of some,46 there is a good 
reason to answer that question in the affirmative. Group A contains the cases with the 
                                                 
42 In the examples here I assume that absent plea bargaining all defendants would elect a trial. This is 
empirically untrue. See Michael L. Rubenstein & Teresa J. White, Alaska's Ban on Plea Bargaining , 13 
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 367, 374 (1979) (showing that Alaska’s ban on plea bargaining increased the number of 
trials, but a substantial minority of defendants still pleaded guilty). Many cases are so strong that the 
probability of acquittal is approaching zero. In these cases, defendants might prefer to avoid the ordeal of a 
trial even if they receive no sentence concession for doing so. Id. at 371. Yet, that does not change the 
analysis in any substantial way. We can put aside these very strong cases, deduct the resources needed for 
them and refer only to the remaining resources and the remaining cases in the following analysis.  
43 See Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion, supra  note 1, at p. 71-72 (estimating that a plea bargain 
saves the prosecutor between 80 to 90 percent of the proceeding’s cost); William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, at 536-37 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law] (“Guilty pleas are not simply cheaper than trials; they are 
enormously cheaper.”).  
44 See Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as a Contract, supra note 1, at 1934. 
45 The quality of a criminal justice system is a factor of, among other things, the number of correct 
convictions and the number of wrongful ones. However, the positive social value of a conviction of a guilty 
person is much smaller than the negative value of a similar conviction of an innocent. This fact is reflected 
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highest expected value per resources. When plea bargains increase the prosecutor’s 
capacity, she has to choose additional cases to which she attaches a lower grade. On 
average, these Group B cases will be more expensive, create lower post-conviction value, 
and, most importantly, be weaker than the cases in Group A. 47 This does not mean, 
however, that each case in Group B is weaker than every case in Group A. A prosecutor 
can sometimes give a weaker case a higher grade than a stronger one, because the 
conviction in the former is more important to her, or because prosecuting it is less 
expensive. But since the probability of conviction is one of the factors that influence the 
choice of cases, the cases in Group B will be, on average, weaker than those in Group A.  
Because the cases are on average weaker, the proportion of innocent defendants in 
Group B is higher than in Group A. If trials have anything to do with revealing guilt, the 
strength of a case is necessarily correlated with the probability that the defendant is 
guilty. 48 Therefore, allowing plea bargaining increases the proportion of wrongful 
prosecutions.  
While the argument that plea bargaining should be barred in order to reduce the 
number of wrongful convictions has some merits, it is a weak one. The prosecutor takes 
weaker cases when plea bargaining is available because she can process more cases in 
                                                 
47 See also  Wright, supra  note 10, (manuscript at 39, on file with author) (“[N]ewly-added cases are likely 
to involve less serious crimes or less persuasive evidence.”).  
48 Otherwise, a trial is no better than a toss of coin. In very strong cases the probability that the defendant is 
guilty goes much beyond reasonable doubt. For example, when the defendant denies sexual intercourse 
with the victim, while DNA evidence together with other types of evidence proves he was the rapist, the 
probability that he is innocent is minute. On the other hand, if the strongest evidence against the defendant 
is an interested informant’s testimony or an eye witness identification, a trial is less likely to result in a 
conviction (the case is weaker), and if a conviction is acquired, it is more likely to be wrongful. See Gross 
et al., supra note 27, at 542 (“The most common cause of wrongful convictions is eyewitness 
misidentification”); DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra  note 32, at 263 (noting that misidentification was 
found to be the number one cause of wrongful convictions by a large margin in the Innocence Project). In 
fact, if the correlation between the probability of conviction at trial and the probability that a defendant is 
actually guilty is weak, then the situation of the criminal justice system is grim regardless of plea 
bargaining.  
22
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such a regime. Even without plea bargaining, the prosecutor would have brought the 
weaker cases if she had received additional resources. Unless one believes that 
prosecutors should have fewer resources, the mere fact that plea bargaining increases 
prosecutors’ case capacity cannot be considered a disadvantage. It is more likely that 
society is better off when cases in Group B are not dismissed, even though they are less 
valuable than cases from Group A. 49 In any case, if society desires to reduce prosecutors’ 
capacity, it can do so by reducing prosecutorial resources instead of prohibiting plea 
bargaining. That would achieve the same goal while saving total societal resources. 
Hence, a ban on plea bargaining can hardly be justified on that ground alone.50  
3. Other Effects on Screening Decision 
Plea bargaining does not only affect the cost of handling a case. It also affects the 
probability of conviction. In fact, if plea bargain offers are good enough, almost all 
defendants will accept them. This is probably the current situation in America, where 
guilty pleas account for more than 95% of convictions. Prosecutors can now assure a 
conviction in both weak and strong cases. This seems to diminish the importance of the 
strength of the case, thus reducing the relative advantage of strong cases. If this is correct, 
permitting plea bargaining encourages prosecutors not only to increase the overall 
number of cases but also to divert resources from strong cases to weaker ones.  
Yet, this effect is not as substantial as it might first seem. Though plea bargaining 
increases the probability of conviction in weak cases, it usually decreases the value of 
                                                 
49 For a different view, see Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra  note 4, at 93 (arguing 
that rigorous prosecutorial screening that would result in fewer prosecutions is superior to allowing plea 
bargaining because, among other things, it reduces the conviction risk for innocent defendants).  
50 Moreover, there are reasons to believe that courts will look for other ways to dispose of the increasing 
caseload resulting from the ban, and thus apply a cheaper and less accurate proceeding. In such a case 
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those convictions. The plea bargain sentence in a weak case must be substantially lower 
than in a similar strong case in order to induce the defendant to accept the offer in the 
face of a good chance of acquittal at trial. Since prosecutors likely prefer, in most cases, 
that defendants be sentenced severely,51 the lower sentence reduces the value of the 
conviction.  
For example, the value of several years of imprisonment for a rape defendant in a 
strong case is likely to be much higher than the value of a plea bargain for a probation 
sentence in a similar weak case.52 In other words, while plea bargaining eliminates the 
gap between the probability of conviction in weak and strong cases, it creates a new gap 
between the two types of cases in the value of conviction. 53 
The aggregated effect of these two conflicting phenomena is hard to measure and 
varies from one case to the next. On the one hand, settlements in weak cases require very 
substantial concessions. As demonstrated in Part IV B., defendants’ loss aversion and 
their high discount rate of future suffering are likely to result in very lenient plea 
bargaining. 54 This is likely to make weak cases relatively less attractive in a plea 
bargaining system.  
                                                 
51 For prosecutors who prefer lighter sentences see infra  note 167 and accompanying text.   
52 See Alschuler’s examp le, supra  note 25. 












G = .  The variable Vs (the value of plea bargain conviction) might be smaller or bigger than Vt·P (the 
expected conviction value at trial); but since Rs (the cost of a plea bargain) is much smaller than Rt (the cost 
of a trial), Gs (the grade of the case if it is settled) is almost always much higher than Gt (the grade of the 
case if it is tried).  
54 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.  
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On the other hand, in many cases prosecutors believe that the post-trial sentence is 
too harsh. 55 In these cases, only a portion of the large sentence discount offered to weak 
case defendants would be considered by prosecutors as a discount. In such a situation, the 
conviction’s value in weak cases is not much lower than in strong ones. If the latter effect 
is very substantial, there is reason to believe that plea bargaining encourages prosecutors 
to substitute strong cases with weaker cases, and thus aggravate the innocence problem.  
All of the above leads to the conclusion that plea bargaining increases the number 
of prosecutions in weak cases and probably also increases the proportion of weak cases 
among cases prosecuted. This is not the whole picture. This article will later demonstrate 
that since prosecutors dislike losing cases in trial, plea bargaining is even more likely to 
increase the risk of conviction for innocent defendants. But before that, the next section 
will turn to an alternative which addresses the innocence problem better then either a total 
ban or the existing plea bargaining system: a partial ban.  
II. Partial ban 
Until now, I have been following the well-worn path of existing plea bargaining 
literature, examining justifications for allowing or banning plea bargains. Such an 
approach compares only two alternatives: a system where the prosecutor can freely offer 
any plea bargain and another in which plea bargaining is completely prohibited. But there 
is a third alternative, one that bans some bargains but allows others. Such a “partial ban” 
might restrict sentence concessions to a certain percentage of the post-trial sentence.  
                                                 
55 See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2548 (2004) [hereinafter Stuntz, Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow] (arguing that in many cases 
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The partial ban can be enforced by the courts. With the partial ban in place, courts 
will reject plea bargains if the resulted sentence is lower than allowed. This better 
addresses the innocence problem than the two alternatives that have been extensively 
considered in the existing literature.  
A. The Screening Effects of a Partial Ban 
This section compares advantages of the partial ban with the “no ban” and “total 
ban” approaches. To simplify the analysis, throughout most of this section I will assume 
that only sentence bargaining is available, leaving the issue of charge bargaining for later. 
In this simplified system, the prosecutor offers the defendant a sentence and the 
defendant can accept the offer or reject it and go to trial. If he accepts the offer, the judge 
will impose the recommended sentence. If a partial ban is imposed, cour ts will reject the 
plea bargain whenever the suggested sentence is significantly lower than the post-trial 
sentence. For convenience I will call such plea bargains “exceedingly lenient bargains.”  
Exceedingly lenient bargains are unique because they signal weak cases. A 
defendant who knows that the probability of acquittal at trial is substantial will only agree 
to plead guilty in return for an exceedingly lenient bargain.56 In stronger cases, the 
prosecutor will not offer exceedingly lenient bargains, knowing that the defendant will 
settle for much less. Therefore, by comparing the post-trial sentence to the bargained 
sentence the court can discern information about the strength of the case.  
It may be argued – in the spirit of the arguments against a total ban – that a partial 
ban would force potentially innocent defendants to face a trial, instead of allowing them 
                                                 
56 See supra  note 26 and accompanying text.  
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to plea bargain. 57 But unlike the total ban, the most substantial effect of the partial ban is 
not an increase in the rate of trials – it is a change the prosecutor’s choice of cases. With a 
partial ban in place, the prosecutor would not be able to reach a plea agreement in most 
weak cases. At the same time, unlike a total ban, almost all strong cases would be settled. 
As a result, prosecutions of weak cases would cost much more than those of strong cases. 
The prosecutor would have to dismiss multiple strong cases in order to bring charges in 
one weak case.58 This would serve as a substantial incentive against bringing charges in 
weak cases.59  
For example, assume that the prosecutor can handle either ten settlements or one 
jury trial within a specific timeframe. Assume further that the prosecutor must decide 
how to proceed with a few strong cases of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), 
and, using Alschuler’s example,60 one very weak rape case. The prosecutor can 
reasonably assume that the rape defendant will plead guilty to a reduced charge that 
would result in a very lenient sentence, but would refuse a more severe sentence because 
he knows he is very likely to be acquitted at trial.  
                                                 
57 See supra  note 35 and accompanying text. See also , Scott & Stuntz, Imperfect Bargains, supra  note 6, at 
2013; Church, supra  note 6, at 516 (arguing that the defendant is better off if he is allowed to plea bargain). 
But see Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra  note 1, at 1985-86 (arguing that there are 
externalities to wrongful convictions and thus society should prevent a potentially innocent defendant from 
pleading guilty).  
58 See Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 
125, 143 (1998) (“Trials are time consuming and expensive, they are scarce resource… If possible a likely 
loss at trial will be avoided through generous plea bargaining; if not, the case may be dismissed).  
59 In some jurisdictions prosecutors might currently have sufficient resources to bring additional cases 
without dropping others. But even these relatively unoccupied prosecution offices rely heavily on guilty 
pleas. Currently, plea of guilt account for more than 95% of convictions. If the partial ban is imposed, the 
unburdened prosecutors might still be able to bring charges in a few weak cases by slightly increasing the 
rate of trials. But substantial increase in trials’ rate is impossible without additional resources. Thus a 
prosecutor that would try to bring too many weak cases would quickly find herself overburdened. 
60 See supra  note 25. For another example of prosecutorial practice of reduction of weak rape cases to 
misdemeanor charges see supra  note 26. 
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If there is no ban on plea bargaining, the prosecutor might very well settle the 
rape case, knowing she can still settle nine additional DUI cases. In such a system, the 
cost of the weak rape case is similar to the  cost of an alternative strong case for a more 
minor offense. If a total ban is imposed the prosecutor has to try each case she chooses to 
take. Thus she can choose one case, which can be either one of the misdemeanor cases or 
the rape case. Though the chance of winning the rape case is lower, the prosecutor is still 
likely to prefer this case because a rape conviction is much more significant. Therefore, a 
total ban might not be sufficiently effective in encouraging prosecutors to dismiss weak 
cases.  
However, with a partial ban, taking the rape case to trial would result in giving up 
ten DUI guilty pleas. And though the prosecutor might pursue the weak rape case at the 
cost of one strong DUI case, she is much less likely to risk a trial in that weak rape case 
at the cost of ten DUI guilty pleas. Therefore, a partial ban would result in fewer weak 
cases and thus in a lower proportion of wrongful convictions than the two alternative 
systems.  
In fact, if a trial is on average ten times more expensive then a guilty plea, then a 
weak case is preferable over a strong one only if the expected conviction’s value in the 
weak case is ten times higher than in the strong case. Weak cases would suddenly 
become ten times less attractive then they are without the partial ban, making strong 
cases much more attractive relatively.61 And if trials in weak cases are on average more 
expensive than other trials, weak cases might become even less attractive.  
                                                 
61 For simplicity I assumed that the cost of the case is influenced only by the way it is disposed, by trial or 
plea bargain, and not by its severity. Though this is probably not true, the analysis does not change 
substantially if we do take into account that severer cases cost more. For example, if plea bargain in a DUI 
case costs one day of work, a plea bargain in the rape case costs two days of work, a trial in the DUI case 
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Of course, a partial ban cannot assure that the prosecutor would never bring a 
weak case. In some cases, the conviction’s value of the weak case is high enough to 
compensate the prosecutor for both the low probability of conviction and the high cost of 
trial. Nevertheless, if the cost of weak cases becomes approximately ten times higher than 
it was pre-ban, while the cost of strong cases remains unchanged, the proportion of weak 
cases must decrease significantly.  
It is important to emphasize that the partial ban not only protects innocent 
defendants better then the regular plea bargaining system; it also protects them better than 
a total ban on plea bargaining. As discussed above, a total ban increases the cost of all 
cases, weak and strong. Thus, prosecutors might still prefer many weak cases where 
innocence is more likely. A partial ban only increases the cost of weak cases, and thus 
makes these cases relatively more expensive. With fewer weak cases brought, fewer 
innocent defendants face the risk of conviction.  
The partial ban can have a positive side effect in very costly cases. Currently, 
when prosecution is very expensive, the defendant’s bargaining power increases.62 
Sometimes that results in exceedingly lenient bargains even though the case is strong. 
The partial ban ties the prosecutor’s hands and prevents her from offering such lenient 
                                                                                                                                                 
costs ten days and a trial in the rape case costs twenty days, then the prosecutor faces a similar dilemma, 
only now she knows that for trying the rape case she must give up twenty DUI guilty pleas (instead of ten), 
or two DUI trials (instead of one). Still, the partial ban would make the weak case ten times more expensive 
then it was without it by forcing the prosecutor to dismiss twenty DUI cases if she decides to prosecute the 
weak rape case.  
62 The defendant acquires this bargaining power only when taking the case to trial is uniquely expensive. In 
a typical case, the prosecutor has a monopoly power she might lose if she gives in to the defendant’s 
pressure to improve the offer. She knows that any unique discount she gives in one case would encourage 
defense attorneys to demand similar discount in future similar cases. If she needs to increase the rate of 
guilty plea she can adjust her plea bargain offers down to all defendants, but after she determines her 
“tariff” she is better off adhering to it.  On the other hand, the defendant is much more of a “one time 
player”, and thus would not reject a favorable plea bargain just in order to maintain a reputation of a tough 
negotiator. Only in uniquely costly cases, a dual monopoly situation is created. This can be the case when 
the defendant’s agreement can save the prosecutor a very costly trial and the uniqueness of the case reduces 
the risk that the discount would serve as a precedent for future defendants. 
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bargains. Knowing that he cannot exploit the unique trial aversion of the prosecutor, the 
defendant would thus agree to a milder discount. The partial ban, therefore, restricts his 
ability to gain an excessive concession.  
Note the difference between weak cases and costly cases. When a case is weak, 
the defendant would reject any bargain which is not exceedingly lenient, even if he 
knows that the prosecutor would proceed with the case to trial. On the other hand, when 
the case is costly but strong, the defendant would accept a milder plea concession if he 
knows that the alternative is not an improved bargain but a trial. That is why restricting 
the prosecutor’s ability to offer excessive concessions can result in harsher plea bargains 
in costly cases but not in weak cases.  
I do not mean to say that the partial ban is a panacea. The recent exonerations of 
hundreds of murder and rape defendants showed that police and prosecutorial misconduct 
and eye witness misidentification can sometimes result in a strong case against innocent 
defendant.63 Yet, as I will show in the next Part,64 the correlation between the strength of 
a case and the probability that the defendant is guilty justifies the different attitude to 
strong and weak cases, even though it cannot totally prevent wrongful convictions.  
Another caveat is required. The partial ban, in itself, can not remedy the risk that 
detained defendants would plead guilty in return “time served”, 65 or would prefer a plea 
bargain when they reach the conclusion that the post plea imprisonment sentence is likely 
to be shorter than the expected length of pretrial detention. 66 Here, a complementary 
                                                 
63 See Gross et al., supra note 27 (analyzing hundreds of exoneration cases, mostly in murder and rape 
cases).  
64 See infra  Part III 
65 See HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT , 47-48 (1982) (describing the pressure on 
defendants in pretrial detention to plead guilty and gain their immediate release). 
66 See Bibas, Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra  note 5, at 2492-93 (“pretrial detention places a high 
premium on quick plea bargains in small cases, even if the defendant would probably win acquittal at an 
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measure should be adopted to reduce the risk for this group of defendants. For example, 
one might consider a rule requiring courts to release defendants on own recognizance if 
they can show that the detention duration is approaching the imprisonment term they 
should expect if they plead guilty. I will not try to develop an argument for such a rule 
here. Instead I will concede that, absent additional adjustments, the partial ban is less 
effective in such cases.67 Still, in most cases defendants are either released on bail or 
expected to serve a term much longer then their time in detention and the “time served” 
plea bargains are not at issue.  
B. Reevaluating the Parties’ Incentives 
The case in favor of a partial ban set out above assumes that prosecutors only 
want to maximize aggregated conviction’s value. It also does not fully take into account 
the effects of plea bargaining on defendants and effects of differences between 
defendants. Yet, a more complicated accounting of the parties’ incentives does not 
undermine the argument and might even strengthen the case for the partial ban.  
1. Reevaluating the Prosecutor’s Incentives  
Until now it has been assumed that the prosecutor only seeks to maximize the number of 
convictions weighted by their respective values. This assumes that the prosecutor only 
                                                                                                                                                 
eventual trial.”) See also  Brian A. Reaves & Jacob Perez, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants, 1992, in 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE , BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIST ICS BULLETIN 1, 14 (Nov.1994) (showing that about 
21 percent of detained defendants are not convicted at the end, and among those who are convicted, only 50 
percent are sent to prison, while the rest are either sent to jail terms (38%) or not incarcerated at all (13%). 
Many of these defendants can spend a shorter term behind bars if they plead guilty, regardless of their 
chances at trial); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT : HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER 
CRIMINAL COURT , at 236 (1979) (Showing that in a sample of cases from the court of common pleas in 
New Haven “[r]oughly four times as many people were incarcerated before disposition than after 
disposition”). 
67 It might still be somewhat effective because reducing the trial penalty might encourage some of the 
defendants to confront unestablished charges in order to vindicate their innocence or avoid a criminal 
record, even though it would not shorten their term in custody.   
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cares about the result of the cases, but does not care how these results come about. Most 
importantly, it means that the value of an unprosecuted case and the value of an acquittal 
in a jury trial are identical – both have a value of zero. In reality, however, this is untrue. 
Prosecutors have a strong aversion to losing trials.68 First, a jury trial resulting in acquittal 
can harm the prosecutor’s reputation or be perceived as a personal failure.69 Second, if 
the loss is made public, it might have political ramifications for prosecutors, who are 
often elected officials.70 Third, decisions not to prosecute are usually less publicized then 
acquittals and therefore their negative impact on deterrence is less severe. Fourth, there is 
a common human inclination to sacrifice some expected benefits in order to avoid loss.71 
Prosecutors might want to avoid the feeling of regret after time and money were devoted 
in vain to a case.  
This aversion to acquittals can help justify a ban on plea bargaining. When plea 
bargaining is not restricted, almost all cases, weak and strong, are settled and thus the 
strength of the case does not influence the chances of receiving a conviction. On the other 
hand, without plea bargaining most cases go to trial.72 In trial, weak cases are much more 
likely to result in acquittals, which the prosecutor wants to avoid. Thus, compared to a 
                                                 
68 See Lynch, supra note 20, at 2125.  
69 See Bibas, Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 5, at 2472; (“[Prosecutors] may further their careers 
by racking up good win-loss records, in which every plea bargain counts as a win but trials risk being 
losses.”); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining , supra note 2, at 106-107 (noting that 
prosecutors are often measured by the rate of convictions and thus care much more about conviction than 
about the sentence). 
70 Stuntz, Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra  note 43, at 534 (referring to the practice of many 
elected prosecutors to cite their conviction rate in their campaign as evidence to the prosecutor’s interest in 
winning cases).  
71 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk , 47 Econometrica 263 (1979) (stating that people are risk averse in choices involving sure gain but risk 
preferring with regard to losses). For a discussion of loss aversion implication to law, see Christine Jolls , 
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1484 (1998). 
72 Where the probability of acquittal is minute, some defendants might plead guilty even if they gain no 
plea concession, just in order to avoid the cost of the trial. These very strong cases will result in guilty pleas 
whether plea bargaining is allowed or not, and therefore they can be disregarded in this analysis.   
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no-ban system, a total ban better protects the innocent. Nevertheless, both systems are 
inferior to the partial ban. With a partial ban, a trial loss is probable in weak cases, while 
strong cases are settled and become virtually risk free. The relative advantage of strong 
cases in a partial ban system is therefore much higher than in a total ban system.  
To illustrate, consider a situation in which the prosecutor has to choose one of the 
following two cases. The first is a weak case, where the probability of acquittal at trial is 
60%. The second is a strong one, where the chances of losing at trial are only 30%. When 
plea bargaining is unrestricted, both cases can be settled and acquittal is unlikely no 
matter which case the prosecutor takes.  
If the same choice appears when plea bargains are totally banned, however, the 
aversion to acquittals would play a role. The probability of losing the strong case is only 
30%, while the chance of losing the weak case is 60%. The prosecutor who wants to 
reduce the risk of losing at trial would be more inclined to choose the strong case.  
If a partial ban was in place, the strong case would be settled, and thus the risk of 
losing it would be 0%. On the other hand, the prosecutor would have to try the weak case. 
Hence, choosing the weak case would increase the risk of failure by 60% (from 0% to 
60%), much more than the risk increase caused in the total ban system (from 30% to 
60%). In such a case, the conviction’s value of the weak case would have to be much 
higher, in order to justify such a higher risk.73  
                                                 
73 Adapting the formula from supra  notes 41 and 53 to the aversion to acquittals would require adding the 
factor L, which represents the prosecutor’s disutility from a loss, to the grade of weak cases. Thus, the 












G = where Gs is the grade of a settled case, Vs is the value of conviction through settlement and Rs 
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Put differently, the prosecutor’s aversion to acquittals would encourage her to 
screen away weak cases, even when all plea bargains are banned – but this effect would 
be stronger if the ban was only partial.74 Note that this effect operates even if trials are as 
inexpensive as plea bargains. It adds to the already substantial incentives the prosecutor 
has to dismiss weak cases because of their costs.75  
Other factors affecting the prosecutor’s decision to plea bargain must also be 
considered. First, some prosecutors might want to experience a jury trial from time to 
time in order to gain trial experience or for the excitement of a trial.76 Yet, this has only 
relatively small effect on weak cases, since prosecutors would probably prefer to try 
winnable cases and not cases they are likely to lose.  
Second, and more significantly, trials are more likely in some high profile cases 
where substantial compromises are politically unfeasible. For example, prosecutors might 
be able to resolve many homicide cases through charge bargains. Yet, dropping or 
                                                                                                                                                 
the resources required for a settlement. Since the expected disutility from acquittals (1-P)L is positive, the 
relative advantage of a settlement increases.  
74 Prof. William Stuntz argues that prosecutors are more averse to losses because losses are so rare. Thus, 
he claims, if trials would be more common, prosecutors would be less bothered by losses. See Stuntz, supra  
note 43, at 534. If that is true, the advantage of the partial ban over the total ban is even bigger. A total ban 
would result in many more trials and thus dilute the effect of loss aversion. When prosecutors are less 
averse to losses, they are less mindful to the strength of the case. A partial ban, on the other hand, still 
allows the prosecutor to secure guilty pleas in the vast majority of the cases, thus preserving loss aversion 
and discouraging prosecution of weak cases.  
75 In fact, the advantage of the partial ban over the total ban might be even more substantial because of the 
phenomenon called the “certainty effect.” Loss aversion is substantially more influential when people have 
the option to choose between a “gamble” and a certain event. People overweigh outcomes that are 
considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk , 47 Econometrica 263, 265-67 (1979). 
When a total ban is in place, prosecutors are required to choose between two “gambles,” a trial in a weak 
case and a trial in a strong case. Even in such a case, loss aversion plays a role in favor of the stronger case. 
Yet, this role is much more substantial when the partial ban assures that the stronger case would result in a 
certain victory. In such a case, the prosecutor has to choose between a certain conviction in the strong case 
and a risky trial in the weak one. Because of the certainty effect, she is much more likely to opt for the 
former alternative.  
76 See Cheryl X. Long & Richard T. Boylan, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal 
Prosecutors, JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, (forthcoming October 2005) (showing that federal 
prosecutors are more likely to take cases to trial in districts where the salaries in the privet sectors are 
higher, and arguing that prosecutors in these district are more influenced by the incentives to gain trial 
experience.) 
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reducing homicide charges is often politically costly. Therefore, prosecutors are bound to 
dedicate resources to trying these cases, even when they are weak.77 That might explain 
the relatively high acquittal rate in state murder cases.78 In these cases, where prosecutors 
are limited by such political restrictions, the partial ban would have virtually no effect. 
Yet, in the majority of cases which do not capture the public’s eye, political restrictions 
play a much milder role. The partial ban is needed to affect prosecutors’ decision in these 
cases.79  
2.  Reevaluating the Defendant’s Incentives 
The partial ban aims to influence prosecutorial discretion. Hence, the 
effectiveness of the partial ban depends first and foremost on the prosecutors’ incentives 
in choosing cases. But this does not mean that the defendant’s decisions are irrelevant. 
When the prosecutor decides who to charge, she takes into account the potential reaction 
of the defendant. The prosecutor needs to know whether the defendant would agree to 
plead guilty in return for the limited concession allowed by the partial ban when she 
decides whether to prosecute him. She cannot simply prosecute him and then dismiss the 
charges if he rejects the offer, because this would undermine the credibility of her threat 
to try defendants that refuse to plea bargain, leading future defendants to reject offers that 
they would otherwise accept.  
                                                 
77 See Daniel C Richman & William J Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of 
Pretextual Prosecution , 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600-605 (arguing that unlike the federal system, state 
prosecutors are more often politically obliged to prosecute a defendant for the offense he is suspected of 
committing, and thus cannot drop the case or offer a charge bargain).  
78 See Id. at 608 (“These data suggest that, at least in high-crime cities and counties, "truth in charging" is a 
fairly strong norm and that district attorneys in those high-crime jurisdictions prefer to charge serious 
crimes and lose than to charge unrelated lesser crimes and win.”) 
79 For example, in drug cases, prosecutors can often alter the charges or amount of drug in order to secure 
virtually any plea bargain they want. See Id. at 608.  
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Prosecutors can estimate with reasonable accuracy how strong a case should be in 
order to extract a plea bargain from an average defendant. But not all defendants are 
average - different defendants might behave differently in similar cases. Defendants 
might have different attitudes toward risk. Some might misestimate the probability of 
guilt or the trial sentence. Bad representation and irrational behavior can lead some 
defendants to reject bargains they are better off accepting and cause others to accept 
bargains they should reject.80 Thus, the prosecutor might know the probability that a case 
would result in a plea bargain, but not the actual result in a specific case.  
These idiosyncrasies are likely to drive prosecutors to establish a safety margin, 
and prosecute stronger cases then they would have taken had all defendants been average. 
Since a plea bargain is substantially cheaper than a trial, the expected cost of a potential 
mistake is usually much higher then the expected benefits from choosing a borderline 
case instead of a stronger one.81 The size of this margin will be larger when her resources 
are more limited, when her aversion to acquittals is greater, and when the alternative 
cases she can bring are more attractive.82 The diminutive trial rate today is consistent 
                                                 
80 Bibas, Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra  note 5, at 2476-87, 2496-2504. 
81 Compare with  STEVEN SHAVEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 80 (1987) (showing that for 
similar reasons a potential tortfeasor would take an excessive level of care when the standard that exempts 
him from liability is unclear). 
82 The idiosyncrasies of defendants would also influence the plea bargain offers in clearly strong cases. In 
these cases, the prosecutor would not necessarily offer the defendants the lowest allowed offer, because the 
defendant would be willing to accept a harsher sentence as well. Since the prosecutor cannot know the 
highest acceptable sentence of each defendant, she must offer settlements that are attractive enough to 
assure that most of the defendants – including many sub-average defendants – will accept them. Here 
again, the level of concession in these cases depends on the prosecutor’s willingness to risk a jury trial. The 
prosecutor might try to reveal the defendant’s limit sentence by first offering a high sentence, then lowering 
it if the defendant rejects it outright. Any defense attorney, however, would begin to anticipate this practice 
and automatically refuse initial offers in anticipation of better ones, regardless of whether these offers are 
below or above his client’s limit sentence. Ultimately the prosecutor will have to signal which offer is her 
final one and the defendant will only treat that offer seriously. Hence this technique will fail in revealing 
the limit sentence of each defendant. 
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with the preposition that prosecutors’ preference for plea bargains is strong, and thus they 
are likely to establish sizeable safety margins.  
All of this has little qualitative effect on the analysis of a partial ban system. The 
prosecutors’ safety margins should be taken into account when courts decide how 
restrictive the partial ban should be. Courts might need to allow more settlements then 
they would have allowed had all defendants been average.83 Yet, the bargained sentence 
still signals the strength of the case, and when it is sufficiently lower than the post-trial 
sentence, it signals that the case is weak.  
One important implication of the above analysis is that the specific attitude of 
each defendant is usually insignificant. Since the prosecutor has to decide whether a case 
is strong enough during the screening stage, and not during plea bargaining, she cannot 
usually know the preference of the specific defendant. She would thus dismiss weak 
cases even against defendants who for different reasons are willing to accept small plea 
concessions even though they have a good chance at trial.  
III. Challenging the Justification to Screen Weak Cases 
Part II showed that the partial ban can achieve its goal and discourage prosecutors 
from pursuing weak cases. This part will address a more basic challenge to the partial ban 
– a critique on its aim. It might be argued that the prosecution of weak cases should not 
be discouraged, for different, sometimes conflicting, reasons. First, it can be argued that 
plea bargains properly mitigate the “all or nothing” approach of trials by allowing 
settlements that reflect the strength of the case. Therefore, according to the argument, 
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weak cases should not be dismissed; they should be settled. Second, it is sometimes 
argued that weak cases may become strong after a trial takes place, because trials can 
reveal new incriminating information. Thus, weak cases should not be dismissed; they 
should be tried. Third, a settlement can help the prosecutor to convict a clearly guilty 
defendant when technical legal rules, like the exclusionary rule, weaken the case. In such 
cases, the argument proceeds, weak cases should be settled, not dismissed. Fourth, it 
might be argued that existing institutions like grand jury review and preliminary hearing 
already prevent prosecutors from bringing weak cases, thus making the partial ban 
unnecessary. None of these critiques should undermine arguments in favor of the partial 
ban.  
A. The Probability of Guilt Argument 
Some scholars assert that settlements in borderline cases are morally superior to 
trial results.84 Judge Easterbrook presented this argument as follows. The probability that 
the defendant is factually guilty can be somewhere between 0.5 and 0.999. The burden of 
proof at trial, which reflects the standard of beyond reasonable doubt, is, say, 0.9.85 In a 
trial, the jury tries to analyze the evidence and estimate the probability that the defendant 
is guilty. If the probability of guilt is higher than 0.9, it is rounded up to 1, and if is lower, 
it is rounded to 0. Plea bargains, on the other hand, result in a sentence that reflects the 
                                                 
84 Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, supra  note 1, at 317; Enker, supra  note 29, 114 
(arguing that the intermediate sanction that results from plea bargaining is often more fair than the sentence 
after a jury trial); Gerald E. Lynch, Screening versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off, 
55 STAN L. REV. 1399, 1406 (2002) (“ ‘Bargained’ dispositions of cases in which conviction is uncertain 
may well do a better job of that than the all-or-nothing jury trials.”). 
85 The probability of guilt reflected by the reasonable doubt standard is debatable.  See Alexander Volokh, 
n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997) (describing different attitudes towards the relative costs of 
wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals). I have used the 0.9 standard following Easterbrook, as an 
example, though I believe the standard should be higher and is, in fact, higher. 
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probability much more accurately. “It is hard to see how a process of mandatory rounding 
is necessary for a morally healthy society.”86   
According to Easterbrook, a sentence should be correlated not only to the severity 
of the offense, but also to the probability that the defendant is guilty. In order to see how 
plea bargains in weak cases achieve that goal, take the following example. Consider a 
defendant who faces charges that, if proven at trial, will lead to a sentence of ten years of 
imprisonment. Assume that the probability that the defendant is guilty, as reflected by the 
evidence available to the prosecutor, is 80%. That means a reasonable doubt exists, 
assuming, like Easterbrook, that a probability of 90% reflects the “beyond reasonable 
doubt” standard. The defendant is, thus, likely to be acquitted. In other words, this case is 
weak.  
However, both parties know that the results of jury trials are not certain. While 
most juries will acquit the defendant, some might find him guilty, even though the case is 
weak. Thus, the defendant might be willing to plead guilty if he is offered a greatly 
discounted sentence. For example, he might plead guilty in exchange for a two year 
imprisonment term instead of ten. In this way, plea bargains allow the sentence to reflect 
the weakness of the case. Easterbrook appears to assume that this is a better result than a 
dismissal of that case.  
But why is it better? The “beyond reasonable doubt” standard stems from the a 
core belief of our criminal justice system: that convicting an innocent defendant has an 
extremely high social cost.87 Clearly, a wrongful conviction is much costlier than setting 
                                                 
86 Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, supra note 1, at 317. 
87 See In Re Winship 397 U.S. at 363-64 (1970) (detailing why wrongful convictions are so damaging as to 
justify the beyond reasonable doubt standard). See also  HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
SANCTION, 250 (1968) (“The criminal sanction is the law's ultimate threat. Being punished for a crime is 
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a guilty person free.88 The expected cost of imprisoning a person for ten years when there 
is a reasonable doubt that he is innocent exceeds the expected benefits. Easterbrook does 
not question that assertion, but seems to suggest that even when a reasonable doubt 
exists, the benefits of conviction exceed the costs if the sentence is prorated by the 
probability of conviction. But there is no reason to accept that contention. It is true that 
the expected costs of a shorter sentence are smaller; but so are the expected benefits. And 
a proportional reduction in both benefits and costs cannot transform a negative result to a 
positive one.  
Moreover, convicting the innocent is wrong, regardless of the sentence. Society 
bears a “moral cost” whenever an innocent person is convicted.89 Increasing the risk of 
wrongful convictions makes even less sense in an overburdened criminal justice system, 
where every weak case can be easily replaced by a strong case that can be settled without 
raising the same concerns. Thus, rounding down the punishment to 0 when the case is 
weak is the moral and efficient thing to do. Weak cases should be dismissed, not settled. 
The partial ban achieves that goal.  
                                                                                                                                                 
different from being regulated in the public interest or being forced to compensate another . . . or being 
treated for a disease. The sanction is at once uniquely coercive and, in the broadest sense, uniquely 
expensive.”); Alschuler, supra  note 25, at 714 (arguing that it is worse to convict ten innocent defendants 
and sentence them to one year of imprisonment each than to convict one innocent defendant and sentence 
him to ten years).  
88 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973) (showing that even from a pure economic approach, the cost of convicting the 
innocent is higher then the cost of not convicting the guilty). 
89 R. M. Dworkin, Principles, Policy, Procedure, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72 (1985); Schulhofer, Plea 
Bargaining as Disaster, supra  note 1, at 1986 (arguing that wrongful conviction creates a moral externality 
and thus it is socially preferable that innocent defendants would stand trial even if they are better off 
pleading guilty). 
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B. The Trial as a Truth Revealing Mechanism 
1. Trials in Weak Cases  
The partial ban relies on the prosecutor’s evaluation of the case. If the prosecutor 
estimates that the defendant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt, she will usually reach a 
plea bargain and a conviction; otherwise, the case is likely to be dismissed. In a trial, the 
jury makes the decision whether reasonable doubt exists.  
Some commentators argue that juries are better positioned to correctly evaluate 
the case.90 Opponents to a partial ban might argue that aspects unique to trial, such as live 
testimony and cross examination, may assure a more accurate evaluation of the case than 
the initial assessment of the evidence by the prosecutor.  
Most would probably admit that trials are also problematic and deficient in ways 
that limit the jury’s ability to correctly weigh the available information. 91 It might be 
argued, however, that trial deficiencies are irrelevant because they also influence the plea 
bargaining process.92 For example, prosecutors take into account rules that exclude 
reliable evidence during plea bargaining, because the bargaining takes place in the 
shadow of the trial. When the prosecutor has inadmissible evidence she will disregard it 
in her estimation of whether the case is strong. Thus, it is claimed that prosecutorial 
evaluation of a case suffers from all the deficiencies of a trial without enjoying its 
advantages.93 As a consequence, when a defendant is convicted by a jury, one should 
                                                 
90 Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion, supra  note 1, at 73-74. 
91 See DONALD E. VINSON, JURY PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGIES & TRIAL TECHNIQUES (1993) 
(surveying psychological phenomena that affect juries’ decision irrespective of the actual facts of the case). 
See also  DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra  note 32 (reporting of numerous cases of wrong conviction, 
the vast majority of which resulted from jury trial). The term “correct result” here refers to a result that 
correctly reflects the evidence and the required standard of proof, not necessary a conviction of a guilty 
person or acquittal of an innocent.  
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conclude that there is no reasonable doubt, even if the prosecutor estimated that the case 
was weak. If that is true, weak cases should be tried, not dismissed.  
But this argument assumes all trial deficiencies are systematic and known in 
advance. This is true in such cases as clearly inadmissible evidence. But many truth-
revealing deficiencies at trial are unsystematic and unpredictable. Different developments 
at trial can be overestimated by juries and lead both to wrongful acquittals and wrongful 
convictions.  
For example, the appearance of the witness, his likeability, the way he organizes 
his answer and even the squeaky noise that might come out of his shoes as he walks, can 
influence the way the jurors evaluate their testimony. 94 A simple mistake or slip of the 
tongue of a witness might severely undermine his credibility. 95 Heuristics and biases can 
result in wrong conclusions.96 Jury group dynamics, the way the judge presides over the 
trial and other trial idiosyncrasies might result in an overestimation or underestimation of 
the probability that the defendant is guilty.97  
These deficiencies and others can incorrectly influence the result either way. 98 
There is no reason to assume that the prosecutor’s estimation of the trial result, which 
                                                 
94 See Vinson, supra  note 91, 35-58.  
95 Id. at 37-38. 
96 Id. at 59-81. 
97 For example, see Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP . 
PROBS. 205, 223 (1989) (showing that juries are substantially affected by misperception of the law and that 
jury deliberation usually fails to correct such mistakes); Judith L. Ritter, Our Lips are Moving . . . But the 
Words aren't Clear: Dissecting the Presumption that Jurors Understand Instructions, 69 MO. L. REV. 163, 
197-201 (2004) (surveying empirical evidence that show juries failure to understand legal instructions). See 
also  Rochelle L. Shoretz, Let the Record Show: Modifying Appellate Review Procedures for Errors of 
Prejudicial Nonverbal Communication by Trial Judges, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1273, 1275-81 (1995) 
(showing how nonverbal communication by judges can influence juries’ decisions).   
98 For an excellent review of several biases and heuristics that impedes juries’ ability to reach an accurate 
and rational decision see J.J. Prescott and & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making after 
the Blakely Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. ___ (Forthcoming 2006). 
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relies on her estimation of how an average jury would evaluate the evidence in such a 
case, will be less accurate than the actual jury’s evaluation. 99  
For example, take a case where the prosecutor estimates that the probability that 
the defendant is actually guilty is 85%. That means a reasonable doubt exists, assuming 
conviction is justified only when the probability of guilt is higher than 90%. This is a 
weak case. Suppose that the prosecutor knows that in 30% of such cases, the jury 
believes that the probability of guilt is higher than 90% and will reach a conviction. It is 
possible that the jury is more accurate than the prosecutor because the trial supplied them 
with new truth-revealing information. But it’s also possible that in these cases, the jury 
trial result is an outlier. With different judges, juries, or witness’ behavior on the stand, 
other trials of the same defendant would have resulted in acquittal. In these cases the 
prosecutor correctly estimated that the probability of guilt is lower than 90% - it is the 
jury that made the mistake. Without knowing which phenomenon is more likely, there is 
no reason to believe that the prosecutor estimation of the evidence is less accurate than 
the trial result.  
Moreover, the partial ban does not prevent trials in weak cases, it only prices them 
correctly. Weak cases require trials in order to establish guilt with the necessary certainty. 
Even if a trial can prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt in a few weak cases, one must 
conduct a trial to assure that result. In strong cases, on the other hand, guilt can be 
established without a trial.100 In this sense, it is socially desirable to encourage 
prosecutors to prefer strong cases. In the rare instances where a case should be pursued 
despite its weakness, a prosecutor can still bring charges and bear the cost of a trial.  
                                                 
99 See Gross, supra note 58, at 145-146 (arguing that juries are less experienced than the prosecutor and 
thus cannot systematically correct prosecutors’ charging errors). 
100 See supra  section 2.b.  
43
Gazal:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2005
 43 
For example, a prosecutor might decide that the ability of a trial to reveal the truth 
justifies bringing charges in a weak murder case, although the evidence seems to indicate 
that a reasonable doubt exists. In such cases, the trial will either confirm the estimation 
that a reasonable doubt exists, or remove that doubt. And if the possibility of removing 
the doubt is worth the cost of abandoning several strong cases, then the prosecutor can 
opt for a trial. However, as the prosecutor determines which cases to pursue, it is still 
worthwhile to encourage her to consider the higher cost of proving guilt in weak cases.101 
Therefore, even if trials more accurately evaluate guilt than the prosecutor, the partial ban 
would encourage a more socially desired use of resources.  
2. Trials in Strong Cases 
While there is no reason to condemn the partial ban for discouraging prosecutions 
of weak cases, this proposal might also face criticism from the other side of the spectrum. 
It might be argued that it is wrong to allow settlements in strong cases. If trials are better 
at estimating the probability of guilt than prosecutors, strong cases should not be settled. 
According to this reasoning, the only remedy is a total ban which assures that all cases, 
weak and strong, are tried.  
Here again, trial idiosyncrasies can prove prosecutorial estimation of the case to 
be the more accurate measure of the probability of guilt. But even if juries are, on 
average, better then prosecutors at evaluating evidence, there is no reason to prohibit 
settlements in strong cases. To reach a settlement when the partial ban is in place, it is not 
                                                 
101 One might argue that the difference in costs between strong and weak cases is not significant because 
most of the costs are not trial costs, but jail costs. The prosecutor is the only party that bears the trial costs  
and thus makes wrong judgments. However, there are additional costs in weak cases that the prosecutor 
does not internalize, such as costs to the court (increased docket), juries, and the defense attorney. The 
prosecutor might disregard some of the costs of strong cases but also some of the costs of weak cases. 
Thus, her decision might still be a good reflection of the balance of the different costs in these cases.  
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enough that the prosecutor believes that the case is strong - the defendant must also share 
that belief. If the defendant believes the case is weak, he will reject the offer and go to 
trial. Thus, a plea bargain is reached only when both parties conclude that the case is 
likely to result in conviction. In such a case, it is unlikely that a jury will acquit the 
defendant.  
Furthermore, to the extent that trial can reveal weaknesses which prosecutors 
cannot observe at the time of the decision to file charges, defendants can take that into 
account. Knowing that trials can reveal innocence, an innocent defendant would estimate 
that his chances at trial are better than the prosecutor’s case suggests.102 For example, an 
innocent defendant will likely know if a key state witness is lying. If so, the defendant 
may realize that there is a good chance that at trial the lie will be revealed, perhaps in 
conjunction with other testimony and physical evidence. Therefore, when trials are better 
then the prosecutor in revealing the truth, the innocent defendant is much more likely to 
believe the case is weak and to reject the plea bargain offer.  
Furthermore, innocent defendants might reject an offer, even if a cold calculation 
would support it, because they are unwilling to falsely condemn themselves.103 Therefore, 
innocent  defendants are more likely to reject plea bargains. If plea bargaining is 
unrestricted, prosecutors might overcome innocent defendants’ reluctance to plead guilty 
                                                 
102 See Grossman & Katz, supra note 33, 753-55; Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as a Contract, supra  
note 1, at 1940-1946. See also  Luke Froeb, The Adverse Selection of Cases to Trial, 13 INT 'L REV. L. & 
ECON. 317 (showing that defendants who accept plea bargaining have smaller chances of winning at trials 
and concluding that defendants are in possession of private information about their chances at trial during 
the plea negotiation).  
103 See Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 
1281 (1993) (showing that people are willing to sacrifice their self interest and refrain from accepting 
offers they believe are unfair). Where nolo contendere plea and Alford pleas are available, innocent 
defendants do not have to lie in order to assure a conviction. See Bibas, Harmonizing Values, supra  note 1, 
1382-86 (criticizing the systems that allow plea of nolo contendere or Alford plea, because it encourages 
innocent defendant to plead guilty). 
45
Gazal:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2005
 45 
by offering them substantial concessions. For example, an overloaded prosecutor might 
offer all defendants very favorable plea bargains, driving both guilty and innocent 
defendants to plead guilty. But if she is limited by a partial ban, she can only offer 
smaller concessions. These concessions are likely to be sufficient to induce a guilty plea 
from most guilty defendants but less likely to extract a plea from innocent defendants.   
Of course, this does not mean that an innocent defendant will never accept a plea 
bargain offer when concessions are limited. Some cases may be sufficiently strong to 
persuade even an innocent defendant that a trial is unlikely to reveal the truth, and that he 
should overcome his reluctance to plead guilty to an offense he did not commit, even for 
a limited concession. Still, when the case against the innocent is so strong, a trial will 
likely result in a conviction as well. Hence, a total ban cannot protect the innocent 
defendant facing a very strong case.  
One might still be unconvinced, and believe that innocent defendants are more 
likely to underestimate their chances at trial because they will underestimate the extent to 
which trials reveal innocence. The unconvinced may further believe that over-optimism 
and the other behavioral effects that lead innocent defendant to refuse to plead guilty are 
not substantial enough to overcome this underestimation. I believe that there is no reason 
to expect such a systematic underestimation. But even if that concern were well-based, 
the only way to address it would be to impose a total ban. As has already been 
demonstrated, compared with a partial ban, a total ban will lead to a higher rate of weak 
cases being prosecuted and thus a higher rate of innocent defendants risking conviction at 
trial. That risk to the innocent is much more substantial than any unfounded concern of a 
systematic underestimation of defendants’ chances at trial.  
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C. The Inadmissible Evidence Argument  
Prosecutors might believe that a defendant should be convicted even when the 
case assembled against him is weak. The most obvious example is when the prosecutor 
has inadmissible evidence that suggests or proves guilt; she might base her estimation 
that the defendant is guilty on his criminal history, illegally obtained evidence, hearsay or 
other information that cannot be conveyed to the jury. None of these categories of 
information can be used at trial – but in today’s system all can be used by prosecutors in 
deciding which weak cases should be settled instead of dismissed. A partial ban would 
substantially restrict such a use of inadmissible information.  
Yet, this restriction is socially desirable. True, inadmissible evidence might have 
probative value; but such evidence is inadmissible for a reason. Usually, evidence is 
inadmissible either because it might be prejudicial or otherwise misevaluated, or due to 
policy considerations.104 For example, hearsay rules are allocated to the first group;105 the 
exclusionary rule to the second.106  
If such restrictions are justified, they should not be circumvented through plea 
bargaining. If hearsay testimony is too unreliable to justify a conviction at trial, it is also 
unreliable to justify a plea bargain offer that the defendant cannot refuse. If illegally 
obtained evidence should be precluded from trial in order to deter the police, it should not 
be allowed in through a plea-bargain back door. To the extent that these restrictions are 
unjustified, they should be altered, not circumvented.  
                                                 
104 See BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE  § 1:2 (15th ed. 
2003) 
105 See Moore v. U. S., 429 U.S. 20, 21-22 (1976) (holding that hearsay testimony is inadmissible because, 
absent cross examination, it is unreliable and cannot be evaluated).  
106 The main purpose of the exclusionary rule is to discourage lawless police conduct. See Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (“[The exclusionary rule] is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct in the 
criminal context.”).   
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More importantly, while in some cases a prosecutor might accurately use 
inadmissible evidence in her decision to offer an exceedingly lenient bargain in a weak 
case; in other cases she might abuse her power for the wrong reasons. She might pursue a 
weak case for political reasons. She might believe that the stringent reasonable doubt 
standard is too high and try to undermine it. She might want to impose “justice” on a 
defendant she believes has unjustifiably escaped a previous conviction. She might be 
pressured by the victim or the public to seek a conviction, despite the lack of evidence or 
might simply disregard the possibility that some defendants are innocent when the case 
against them is weak.107  
For these reasons and others our society is unwilling to rely on a prosecutor’s 
beliefs as a sufficient reason to convict in weak cases. She does hold the power to dismiss 
cases, a power that might also be abused or mishandled, but since conviction of the 
innocent is much more troubling then letting a guilty defendant escape trial, this misuse 
of power is a lesser evil.  
D. Existing Tools to Discourage Unestablished Prosecutions 
Accepting that weak cases should be weeded out instead of settled, one can still 
argue that other legal tools, especially grand jury review and preliminary hearing, prevent 
prosecutors from bringing weak cases and that therefore a partial ban is redundant.  
                                                 
107 See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, supra note 2, at 62-64 (showing that 
prosecutors disregard the possibility of wrong conviction and explaining that, in any event, a prosecutor’s 
personal opinion is an inadequate safeguard against conviction of the innocent). For some anecdotal 
examples of how prosecutors can be inattentive to clear exculpatory evidence, see DWYER, NEUFELD & 
SCHECK, supra  note 32, at 78-105 (describing a case in which a prosecutor refused to believe that a 
defendant on death row was innocent even when a DNA evidence clearly proved the defendant’s 
innocence, and the only evidence against him was a statement that could hardly be considered as 
admission); id. at 126-57 (describing prosecutors’ overconfidence in snitches). For different structural 
reasons that might bias prosecutors to be overconfident in the culpability of the defendant, see John D. 
Jackson, The Effect of Legal Culture and Proof in Decisions to Prosecute, in 3 LAW, PROBABILITY AND 
RISK, 109 (2004). 
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There are numerous reasons to believe that weak cases slip through existing 
screening mechanisms with disturbing frequency. First, existing screening tools are 
commonly limited to felony cases, while exceedingly lenient bargains can also be offered 
in misdemeanors. Second, their effectiveness varies from one jurisdiction to another; in 
many places prosecutors can proceed with weak cases rather easily.108 In a substantial 
majority of jurisdictions, the bindover standard for preliminary hearing is very lenient, 
because prosecutors are not expected to show at such an early stage that the prosecution 
is likely to succeed.109 As for the grand jury review, it is almost unanimously accepted 
today that grand juries are ineffective in controlling prosecutorial discretion and rarely 
bar the prosecution of weak cases.110 This is especially significant since prosecutors in 
most jurisdictions can bypass the preliminary hearing by issuing an indictment before the 
hearing takes place.  
Any attempts to improve the grand jury review or preliminary hearings would 
require complicating the preliminary process and introducing expensive and complex 
adversarial features to the pre-trial process. Doing so would only add to the exiting 
pressure to extract waivers from defendants. Hence, these screening procedures are 
                                                 
108 In most jurisdictions, prosecutors can choose between the use of information and indictment, or, at least, 
bypass the preliminary hearing by issuing an indictment before the hearing. See LaFave, Israel & King, 
supra  note 8, § 14.2 (showing that all the jurisdictions that require a grand jury indictment in felony cases 
and most of the jurisdictions that do not, allow prosecutor to bypass the preliminary hearing by issuing an 
indictment prior to the hearing.) Some states allow prosecutor to file felony charges directly, with no 
preliminary hearing of indictment. See Id. § 14.2 (d). Even when preliminary hearing takes place, its 
effectiveness in screening weak cases is highly questionable in some jurisdictions. See Id. § 14.1(a) 
(explaining the reasons for the difference in the effectiveness of the preliminary hearing screening function 
in different jurisdictions).  
109 See Id. § 14.3(a) (“A substantial majority of jurisdictions reject both the prima facie standard and the 
mini-trial type of preliminary hearing . . . The timing requirements are stringent and do not suggest 
affording the prosecution adequate time to bring together its full case in the form of admissible evidence”.)   
110 Id. § 15.3(a) (“Academic commentators have almost uniformly been critical of relying upon grand jury 
screening in its current form to eliminate prosecutions that are weak and arbitrary”). See also Andrew D. 
Liepold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (And Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L.REV. 260 (1995) 
(arguing that the federal grand jury cannot operate as a shield for the accused).  
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bound to be either very elaborate and expensive or ineffective. In contrast a partial ban 
requires no such features because it relies on the person that knows better then anyone 
whether the case is weak – the prosecutor.  
Moreover, the right to preliminary hearing or grand jury review can usually be 
waived; and, in fact, it is waived very often in the context of plea bargaining. Prosecutors 
can, and often do, condition exceedingly lenient bargains on a waiver of preliminary 
hearing or grand jury indictment.111 The partial ban can thus complement or even replace 
the existing mechanisms that are aimed at preventing the prosecution of weak cases. 
E. Parties with Different Estimations of Probability of Guilt  
By discouraging defendants from accepting plea bargain offers in weak cases, the 
partial ban dissuades prosecutors from bringing cases they know to be weak. However, 
when a defendant wrongly believes that the case against him is strong he might still be 
manipulated to accept the offer even if the prosecutor’s case is weak. When defendants 
(and their attorneys) overestimate the strength of their cases, the partial ban is less 
effective.  
This problem is less disturbing then it might at first seem. There are two main 
reasons that might cause a substantia l difference between the parties’ estimation of the 
probability of conviction. First, the defendant and the prosecutor might simply evaluate 
the evidence differently. 112 Evaluating a case is not an exact science, and different 
rational people might reach different conclusions. In some cases defendants might 
                                                 
111 See Id. § 14.2(e) (arguing that the high rate of waivers of preliminary hearing is the result of, among 
other things, “a prosecution practice of offering significant concessions to defendants who waive their 
preliminary hearings”) 
112 See Bibas, Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra  note 5, at 2497 (arguing that defendants’ decisions are 
subject to psychological pitfalls and thus some defendants are more willing to accept plea bargaining than 
the rational choice model suggest, and others are less willing).  
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underestimate the risks; in others they may overestimate them. However, even if a 
defendant is wrong, the prosecutor cannot use such mistakes to bring charges in weak 
cases because she cannot know which defendants overestimate the strength of the case 
when she chooses which cases to pursue. She probably knows that some defendants 
would still be willing to plead guilty even though the case against them is weak, but she 
cannot identify them, and thus cannot treat them differently. 113   
Second, the defendant might have a different estimation of the case because he 
does not know that the prosecutor lacks strong evidence. If the prosecutor knows of the 
defendant’s information deficiency, she might exploit that shortfall to convince him to 
accept a relatively harsh plea bargain. This is clearly true in some cases.114 In many 
jurisdictions, defendants’ disclosure rights in plea bargaining are very limited;115 and 
sometimes even the existing disclosure rules are violated.116 Hence, in some cases, the 
prosecutor might be able to mislead defendants into believing that their case is strong. 117 
                                                 
113 The effects of defendants’ unsystematic misevaluation of cases is similar to the effects of defendants’ 
diversity discussed above. See supra  note 82 and accompanying text. The point here is that the prosecutor 
will not be able to discriminate defendants that overestimate the risk of conviction when she cannot know 
which defendants suffer from such overestimation.  
114 See Eleanor J. Ostrow, The Case for Preplea Disclosure, 90 YALE L.J. 1581, 1584-87 (1981) (showing 
how prosecutors can bluff defendants to believe their case is strong); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in 
Plea Bargaining, supra note 2, at 65-67 (describing instances where prosecutors tried to give defendants 
the impression that their chances at trial are low); Douglass, supra  note 25, at 452-561 (illuminating 
defendants’ information deficits in plea bargaining). 
115 See id. at 452-57; Bibas, Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra  note 5, at 2494-2495 (discussing the limited 
discovery rules in plea bargaining). It is unclear whether there is a constitutional inalienable right for 
disclosure of some information during plea bargaining. In United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), the 
Supreme Court held that defendants can effectively waive their constitutional right for disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence, a right that was recognized in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Yet the court 
did not rule out that other types of information must also be disclosed in order for a guilty plea to be 
deemed voluntary.  
116 Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 
N.C. L. REV. 693, 697-703 (1987)  
117 See supra note 114.  
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The need to improve the effectiveness of the partial ban is just another reason to amend 
these restrictive disclosure rules.118  
Nevertheless, this shortfall should not be overstated. Prosecutors often have good 
reasons to share information, such as personal and professional ethics and the need to 
preserve a good reputation among defense lawyers.119 Moreover, defendants and defense 
attorneys expect to hear the evidentiary basis for the prosecutors’ assertion that the case is 
strong, before they accept it as a fact.120 As a result, it is often hard to mislead the 
defendant into believing that a weak case is strong. If it was always so simple to do so, 
exceedingly lenient bargains would not be as common as they are today.  
Moreover, innocent defendants are less likely to accept the prosecutor’s 
unestablished proclamation that the case against them is strong. The behavior of the 
innocent defendants in the Tulia and Rampart scandals indicate that usually innocent 
defendants would not plead guilty unless they are offered exceedingly lenient bargains.121 
True, the partial ban cannot solve all cases in which lack of disclosure leads to wrongful 
conviction. Yet, given any level of disclosure, the partial ban reduces the risk that an 
innocent defendant will be charged and will plead guilty.  
                                                 
118 For other reasons, see Bibas, Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra  note 5, at 2531-32 (advocating more 
discovery in plea bargaining). See also  Ostrow, supra  note 114. 
119 Douglass, supra  note 25, at 458-60 (“Most discovery occurs outside of the rules, in informal exchanges 
between prosecutors and defense counsel.”); Bibas, supra  note 5, at 2531 (stating that some prosecutors 
routinely provide information in plea bargaining even though they are not obliged to) 
120 Douglass, supra  note 25, at 458 (explaining that the prosecutor disclose material because the defense 
attorney requires the information in order to convince his client to plead guilty). 
121 In the Tulia case, eight defendants insisted on a trial, were convicted by juries with virtually no black 
members and were sentenced to up to 90 years of imprisonment. These trials convinced the remaining 
defendants to accept plea bargains for probation or short imprisonment terms. See Brulliard, supra note 27. 
Similarly, in the Rampart case, innocent defendants accepted exceedingly lenient bargains. For example 
Ruben Rojas plead no contest and received a six year sentence after being threatened with a sentence of 25 
to life at trial. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Even the Innocent Can Be Coerced into Pleading Guilty, L. A. 
TIMES, November 28, 1999, § M, at 5 (reporting of some of the Rampart defendants’ incentives to plead 
guilty). On the other hand, Javier Francisco, the defendant whose conviction later led to the revelation of 
the scandal, rejected the plea bargain offer to serve 13 years, because his lawyer thought the offer is too 
severe. He was later sentenced to 23 years of imprisonment. See Lou Cannon, supra note 27. 
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The same is true when prosecutors try to plea bargain before compiling enough 
evidence. In such cases, prosecutors bargain in order to save resources needed for 
investigation and preparation of the case. Without the partial ban, the prosecutor can offer 
exceedingly lenient bargains to all defendants in this initial stage. This might induce both 
guilty and innocent defendants to accept the plea. With a partial ban, many guilty 
defendants might still be willing to accept the limited sentence concession allowed, 
believing that the prosecutor is likely to find sufficient evidence with further 
investigation. But innocent defendants, unable to receive exceedingly lenient bargains, 
are much more likely to reject these offers, forcing the prosecutor and police to try and 
collect additional evidence. Such further investigation is likely to fail in strengthening the 
case, and thus lead the prosecutor to dismiss the case.  
 
IV. The Feasibility of a Partial Ban 
The partial ban system can address the innocence problem, but is it feasible? The 
answer to that question will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In some places, the 
partial ban could be incorporated rather well, with relatively minor modifications to 
existing rules and practices. In others, it would be difficult to prevent circumvention of 
the ban without major rearrangement of much of the existing system. Since the criminal 
justice system differs significantly from one state to another (and sometimes from one 
county to another) there is no one simple prescription that can assure an effective partial 
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For example, in some jurisdiction it is the judge, not the prosecutor, who conducts 
the plea bargaining directly with the defendants.122 In these systems, the limits should be 
imposed on the judge’s offer. For instance, one might structure a rule in which before 
offering a plea bargain the judge has to state on the record the expected post-trial 
sentence, and only then offer the guilty plea sentence, which must be restricted according 
to the partial ban. 123 In such a case, if the defendant rejects the offer, he is not exposed to 
more than the sentence previously stated by the judge.124  
I will not attempt to take on the impossible task of suggesting how to implement 
the partial ban in every jurisdictional environment. Instead, I will address two of the 
possible obstacles to the feasibility of such a policy which are substantial in almost all 
jurisdictions.  
First, it is hard to determine whether a certain sentence is exceedingly lenient. 
Apart from the definition of exceedingly lenient bargain being far from clear, the 
expected sentence after trial conviction is not always known with sufficient accuracy, 
especially since sentencing is often a discretionary prerogative of the judge. Even when 
the post-trial sentence is more accurately predictable, it is difficult to determine which 
settlements are lenient enough to induce a guilty plea when the case is weak.  
Second, any judicial limits imposed on sentence bargaining can be easily 
circumvented by the use of charge bargaining. It might be argued that curtailing charge 
                                                 
122 See Mike McConville & Chester Mirsky, Guilty Plea Courts: A Social Disciplinary Model of Criminal 
Justice, 42 SOC. PROB. 216 (1995) (describing coercive judicial plea bargaining in New York City’s state 
court);  Alschuler, Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, supra  note 10, at 1087-1091 (describing judicial 
plea bargaining in Chicago). 
123 Such a scheme requires, of course, measures which assure that the judge get reasonable information at 
that stage, but that is an inherent problem in any judicial plea bargaining. For a suggestion of such a 
structure see Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972)  
124 For an elaborated suggestion in this line see, id (suggesting that judges would declare the post trial 
sentence and the discounted guilty plea sentence before the defendant pleads guilty to eliminate the 
uncertainty).  
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bargaining is difficult, and to the extent that it is possible it is undesired, because the 
practice is often necessary to encourage defendants’ cooperation. This Part addresses 
these issues.  
A. The Feasibility of Judicial Review of Sentence Bargains 
The partial ban system relies on courts to review the bargained-for sentence, 
requiring them to reject exceedingly lenient bargains. This task does not require novel 
legal tools. Courts have the power to review sentence bargains. Currently, courts review 
sentence bargains in one of two distinct ways. In some jurisdictions, sentence bargains 
take the form of agreed sentence recommendations. In that case, the parties ask the court 
to impose the stipulated sentence, but the court can reject the request and impose a 
harsher one.125 In other jurisdictions, the parties can agree on a binding sentence. In this 
case, when the court rejects the plea agreement the defendant can withdraw his guilty 
plea.126 In the federal system, both types of sentence bargains are allowed.127  
For the purposes of this Article, however, the difference between these two types 
of agreements is of little importance. With sentence recommendation, the defendant will 
prefer a trial when the case is weak, since he knows the court is likely to reject a 
recommendation for an exceedingly lenient sentence.128 With a binding sentence 
agreement, a court’s rejection will result in a trial or a dismissal of the charges. 
                                                 
125 See Carwile v. Smith, 874 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1989).  
126 See LaFave, Israel & King, supra  note 8, § 21.2(d). 
127 See  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1). The first type of sentence bargains, which rely on sentence 
recommendation, has been justifiably criticized for increasing uncertainty, escalating the problem of 
sentence disparity and resulting in severe mistakes. See Shayna M. Sigman, An Analysis of Rule 11 Plea 
Bargain Options, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1331 (1999) (stating that when judges are allowed to reject 
sentence recommendations without offering the defendant to withdraw his plea, sentence disparity between 
similar offenders increases); Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as a Contract , supra  note 1, at 1955-56 
(criticizing judicial use of power to increase the sentence as a source of mistakes, uncertainty, and  
unnecessary procedural costs);  Alschuler, Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, supra  note 10, at 1070 
(asserting that defendants feel cheated when judges reject the sentence recommendation).  
128 See Sigman, supra  note 127, at 1333-35. 
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Therefore, in both cases, prosecutors would not be able to settle weak cases and thus 
would refrain from prosecuting them.  
True, parties cannot always foresee the court’s decisions. Yet, the prosecutor and 
defense attorney are usually experienced enough to make out whether a certain plea 
bargain is likely to be acceptable. Sentencing guidelines, when applicable, can assist in 
reducing uncertainty. By reducing the parties’ information gap, the guidelines increase 
the efficacy of the partial ban. 129 But even absent guidelines, the parties can usually 
predict whether or not a particular agreement will be acceptable to a judge in their 
jurisdiction.  
With or without guidelines, some borderline settlements will always exist. Court 
decisions can never be predicted with certainty. The prosecutor cannot know if these 
borderline cases will result in an inexpensive settlement or a costly trial. 130 The expected 
cost of these cases will fall somewhere between the cost of a weak case and the cost of a 
strong case. Whether the prosecutor brings these cases depends on her budget and 
willingness to risk going to trial. If she has many strong alternative cases, or if she is  
particularly averse to acquittals, she will prefer to dismiss most of the borderline cases, 
                                                 
129 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines create a relatively unambiguous background sentence by suggesting 
a limited sentence range for each offense, after taking into account the defendant’s criminal record and 
other relevant factors. Then, they allow sentence reduction of two to three levels for acceptance of 
responsibility. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2005). Although acceptance of 
responsibility does not necessarily correlate with a guilty plea, in practice, almost all the defendants who 
plead guilty enjoy the sentence discount. See Wright, supra  note 10, (manuscript at 53, on file with author) 
(“[A]bout 94 percent of the defendants who pled guilty received the discount while only 8 percent of the 
defendants who went to trial were given credit at sentencing for accepting responsibility.”).  In U S. v. 
Booker, 2005 WL 50108 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2005), the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory instead 
of mandatory. If, after Booker, courts depart from the Guidelines in unexpected ways, the ability to foresee 
the expected trial sentence will be reduced. 
130 If the parties reach a binding sentence agreement, the prosecutor can theoretically dismiss the charges 
after the plea bargain is rejected. In this case, there are no borderline cases; the parties always know 
whether the court regards the bargain as exceedingly lenient before they make any irreversible move. Yet, 
in practice, it might be politically impossible to dismiss charges whenever a court rejects a plea agreement. 
Therefore, the prosecutor might still be required to evaluate the probability that an acceptable plea bargain 
would be achieved, before deciding whether to prosecute.  
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and choose only clearly strong ones. In the alternative, she may prosecute several 
borderline cases, knowing that some will result in trial.  
In any event, however, the partial ban creates a relative advantage to strong cases 
over borderline cases and to borderline cases over weak ones. Thus, it still encourages 
prosecutors to divert resources to stronger cases. Whatever the case may be, the 
uncertainty lurking in the margins does not undermine the prosecutor’s basic incentives 
to dismiss weak cases, at least when they are clearly weak.  
B. The Standards for Review 
How big can a sentence discount be without breaching the partial ban? Different 
defendants will be convicted if prosecutors are allowed to offer discounts of up to 20%, 
50% or 80%. Resolving this issue requires an answer to a normative question – which 
cases should be considered “weak” – and an empirical one – how large the sentence 
concession can be without enabling plea bargains in these weak cases. A satisfying 
answer to these two questions is beyond the scope of this article; however this section 
will sketch a possible direction, leaving the more comprehensive response for another 
Article. 
I believe that the partial ban should be tailored to discourage prosecutions when 
an acquittal at trial is more likely than a conviction. In other words, if the probability of 
conviction is lower than 50%, the case should be considered weak. Such criterion means 
that weak cases are those that would result in acquittal if brought before an average 
jury;131 strong cases are cases where an average jury trial would result in conviction.  
                                                 
131 More accurately, the 50% standard imitates the decision of a median jury, not necessarily an average 
one. Yet, since we know nothing about the distribution of possible juries’ evaluations, the median jury is 
probably a good proxy of an average jury.  
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Relying on the expected decision of an average jury assures that the partial ban 
would imitate the standard for conviction applied in trials. An average jury would convict 
the defendant only when his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, this 
criterion assures that only when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty beyond 
reasonable doubt, will the parties regard the case as strong and reach a plea bargain. 
Similarly, when a jury trial is more likely to result in acquittal than in conviction – that is, 
when a reasonable doubt exists – the case would be considered weak and a plea bargain 
would be discouraged.  
True, the reasonable doubt standard currently applies only to trials, not to the 
decision to prosecute. But in a more basic sense, this standard reflects our society’s 
greater concern for wrongful convictions than wrongful acquittals. In a system that relies 
on trials, it is enough to implement this standard at trials. Yet where almost every 
prosecuted case results in a guilty plea conviction, this standard must have a role in the 
screening phase as well. Therefore, plea bargains should be prevented when the 
prosecutor believes that a reasonable doubt exists.  
Implementing this criterion requires evaluating the highest acceptable sentence of 
defendants with up to a 50% chance of acquittal at trial. This highest acceptable sentence 
is likely to be lower than half of the post-trial sentence. Like prosecutors, defendants are 
averse to losses.132 A trial provides defendants an opportunity to be acquitted and thus 
avoid any loss. That makes a trial relatively more attractive and hence drives the highest 
acceptable sentence down. In addition, conviction incurs non legal sanctions. The stigma, 
                                                 
132 See Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205 (1999). 
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social effects and the legal ramifications of conviction are harmful regardless of the 
length of the sentence.133  
Therefore, as the empirical research suggests, most defendants prefer a trial that 
leaves them with some chance of acquittal over a plea bargain to the expected post-trial 
sentence.134 On top of that, any increase in imprisonment term would only affect the 
defendant in the relatively remote future, and such future suffering is heavily discounted 
by defendants.135 Consequently, the highest acceptable sentence is likely to be lower than 
the expected trial sentence.  
Empirical research may be of use to better tailor the partial ban, by indicating the 
highest sentence which defendants would settle for when they have a 50% chance at 
trial.136 For example, one empirical study indicates that a term of three to four months in 
a county jail is about half as severe as a twelve-month term. 137 That can mean that a plea 
                                                 
133 See David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 
733, 772-73 (2001) (describing the effects of social sanctions resulting from conviction); Eric B Rasmusen, 
Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L.  & ECON. 519 (1996) (analyzing the effects 
of the stigma). Furthermore, the first year in prison is likely to cost much more than any additional year. 
The trauma of the encounter with prison in the first few days and weeks is unique and carries 
disproportionate weight compared to any additional time served. See Birke, supra  note 132, at 218 
(explaining why defendants are more affected by the first years in prison than by consecutive equally long 
terms). 
134 See also  William Spelman, The Severity of Intermediate Sanctions, 32 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 107, 
113 (1995) (summarizing empirical studies that found that recent arrestees regard a five-year imprisonment 
sentence as only twice as severe as a one-year sentence, and a ten-year sentence as about four to five times 
more severe than a sentence of one year). 
135 See JAMES Q WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE, 50-51 (1985) (analyzing 
the effect of time on the disutility from punishment); Jolls , Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 71, 1538-1540 
(arguing that defendants do not only have a high discount rate but they employ an hyperbolic discount rate, 
which means that the aversion to near suffering is very strong but that aversion substantially decreases as 
the suffering is more remote).  
136 See Spelman, supra  note 134 (reviewing different surveys that graded the severity of different 
sanctions).  
137 Spelman’s research showed that offenders ranked a sentence of three month in a county jail as slightly 
less then half as severe as a 1-year term (the mean for the three month sentence was 48 points when a 1-
year term was normalized to 100 points). Id. at 120. Two other studies reviewed in Spelman’s article 
reached similar conclusions. Id. at 113. 
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bargain for less than three or four months should not be allowed if a twelve-month 
sentence is expected after trial.  
Additiona l empirical studies that are better tailored for our goal are needed. To 
start, a simple survey that compares defendants’ preferences when they face a 50% 
chance of conviction at trial could supply some information. Yet, even absent such data, 
the 50% standard is clear enough in the majority of cases. For instance, a deferred 
sentence or probation is almost always far less severe than any substantial imprisonment 
term.138 Similarly, any bargained imprisonment term should be deemed as exceedingly 
lenient if it is made in the shadow of the death penalty. 139 And a bargain for a five-year 
sentence is clearly exceedingly lenient if it is made in the shadow of a sentence of life 
without parole.140 All of these settlements, which are permitted today, can reasonably be 
accepted by defendants who are likely to be acquitted at trial.  
On the other hand, a 30% or even 50% shorter imprisonment term usually would 
not meet the exceedingly lenient standard. Currently, the federal sentencing guidelines 
offer approximately a 35% discount for defendants who plead guilty.141 This discount is 
                                                 
138 On the other hand, a severe intermediate sanction, like two years of intensive supervision, is perceived 
by most offenders as a more severe sentence than three months of imprisonment in a county jail. See id. at 
121. Therefore, sometimes it should be permissible to offer a probation sentence instead of a short 
imprisonment sentence, in return for a guilty plea. See also  Peter B. Wood & Harold G Grasmick, Toward 
the Development of Punishment Equivalencies: Male and Female Inmates Rate the Severity of Alternative 
Sanctions Compared to Prison, 16 JUST . Q. 19 (1999) (comparing the severity of different sanctions as 
perceived by inmates).  
139 And, in fact, anecdotal proof shows that innocent defendant pleaded guilty to avoid the death penalty. 
See supra  note 28. 
140 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (concerning a defendant who was sentenced to life 
imprisonment after rejecting an offer to recommend a five-year sentence in return for a guilty plea).  
141 Defendants who plead guilty usually receive two or three level reduction for “acceptance of 
responsibility.” See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2005) (giving the defendant a two-
level reduction for demonstrating acceptance of responsibility and an additional level, at the request of the 
government and under certain additional conditions). See also  Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A 
Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 506 (1992) (estimating that the two-level reduction is equal 
to approximately 25%). Plea bargains can also assure the defendant a sentence in the lower end of the 
guidelines range, which can be considered as additional discount, and, in some cases, an additional one 
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more appropriate and might even be too small. Most defendants would prefer a trial to 
such a settlement when they are likely to win the trial. On the other hand the Guidelines 
can be circumvented through the use of charge bargains. This issue will be addressed 
now.  
C. Charge Bargaining and Cooperation 
While sentence bargains are easy to control, charge bargains present a different 
challenge. A charge bargain is an agreement in which the prosecutor settles for a guilty 
plea to a lesser offense, or drops some of the charges in return for a guilty plea to other 
charges. Most of the examples of the troubling large sentence differentiations are the 
result of charge bargains.142 Charge bargains present a significant concern for the partial 
ban system because they can often escape courts’ review. 143 If agreements are not subject 
to judicial review, prosecutors can effectively promise defendants exceedingly lenient 
                                                                                                                                                 
level of reduction. See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of 
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1155 (2001) (estimating that defendants receive a sentence reduction of 
35% or more for guilty plea). The effects of the decision in U.S. v. Booker, supra  note 129, on the sentence 
discount for guilty plea has not been researched yet. For a formal economic analysis of the Guidelines rule 
see Oren Bar-Gill and Oren Gazal, Plea Bargains Only For the Guilty,  J. L. ECON. (forthcoming). 
142 Alschuler, Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, supra note 2, at 85-105 (describing the pervasive 
effects of overcharging and plea bargaining in different cases); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and 
Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (2003) [hereinafter Wright & Miller, Honesty 
and Opacity] (arguing that the sentence disparity caused by charge bargaining is excessive and unduly 
burden trial rights).  
143 Sentence bargains are equally problematic when the prosecutor has unreviewable influence over the 
sentence; for example, when prosecutor has discretionary power to force a minimum sentence if the 
defendant elects a trial. In such cases, she can assure that defendants who reject her plea bargain offers face 
extremely harsher sentences than defendants who plead guilty. Examples of such power can be found when 
the prosecutor has the power to invoke a habitual offender laws on trial defendants only or when 
prosecutor’s consent is required for a downward departure from sentencing guidelines. See Bordenkircher 
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (holding that due process was not violated when the prosecutor threatened to 
seek an indictment under Habitual Criminal Act that resulted in a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment 
after defendant refused to plead guilty for an agreed sentence of five years). For the prosecutors’ control 
over sentencing in the federal system, see Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing 
Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (2004) (showing how 
congress reinforces prosecutorial power over sentencing and weakens the power of the judiciary); Wright, 
supra  note 10 (analyzing federal sentencing data and concluding that prosecutors often use their influence 
on sentencing to extract guilty pleas from defendants that would have been acquitted at trial). The Supreme 
Court reinstated judicial power, to a certain extent, by rendering the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
advisory in Booker, supra  note 129. 
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bargains in return for their guilty pleas. As long as charge bargaining is unrestricted, the 
efficacy of the partial ban is undermined.144  
Fortunately, legal tools that are already in place in some jurisdictions enable 
courts to review exceedingly lenient charge bargains. For example, in the federal system, 
the parties are required to present charge bargains to the court for acceptance.145 The 
court is instructed not to accept the plea agreement unless it “determines, for reasons 
stated on the record, that the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the 
actual offense behavior and that accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory 
purpose of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines.”146  
In addition, in determining the sentence the court takes into account the conduct 
underlying the charges that were dismissed or reduced.147 Thus, if the court has the 
needed information it can assure that charge bargaining does not result in excessive plea 
concession. A presentence report can provide the court with much of the needed 
information.  
Internal guidelines of the Justice Department further augment courts’ ability to 
review plea agreements by restricting charge bargaining and prohibiting “fact bargains” 
                                                 
144 Anecdotal evidence of the effect of a ban on charge bargaining on the screening decisions can be found 
in the following example. Prof. Alschuler reported a practice of policemen in Illinois that charged every 
suspect of reckless driving with driving while intoxicated, knowing that even the soberest drivers would be 
willing to plead guilty to reckless driving in order to avoid the original charges, and thus save the 
policemen the ordeal of testifying in court. The prosecution solved the problem, simply by prohibiting 
charge reduction in driving while intoxicated offenses. See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea 
Bargaining, supra  note 2, at 94. 
145 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c). 
146 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2(a) (2005). Since U S. v. Booker, 2005 WL 50108 (U.S. 
Jan. 12, 2005), the Guidelines are not binding on the court, but still have an advisory force.  
147 Id. Because the judge is required to take into account the sentencing factors regardless of the charges, 
charge bargaining can affect the sentence only if the statutory maximum sentence for the bargained-for 
offense is less than the Guidelines sentence for the same course of conduct. See also  Frank O. Bowman III 
& Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences 
Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 478, 522 (2002) (“Because of the high statutory 
maximum sentences for drug crimes, charge bargaining often will have little effect in drug cases.”).  
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and other “plea agreement [s] that results in the sentencing court having less than a full 
understanding of all readily provable facts relevant to sentencing.”148 Prosecutors are also 
instructed to put in writing any plea agreement in felony cases and submit the agreement 
to court.149  
These measures, especially when taken together, allow courts to review plea 
agreement and reject exceedingly lenient bargains. That does not mean that currently 
federal judges prevent exceedingly lenient bargains.150 But it does mean that with the 
existing structure, federal judges would be able to prevent exceedingly lenient bargains if 
instructed to do so.151  
A more ambitious response to the problem posed by charge bargaining is to 
abolish the practice altogether. There are many reasons to do away with charge 
bargaining. Charge bargaining motivates prosecutors to overcharge defendants in order to 
improve their negotiating position. 152 Convictions after charge bargains are often 
                                                 
148 See Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors, Department Policy 
Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing (Sept. 22, 2003) available 
at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/ashcroft92203chrgmem.pdf.  
149 Id. See also  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2) 
150 Empirical research of the practices in the early 1990’s showed that in a substantial minority of cases, 
charge bargaining resulted in Guidelines circumvention. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra  note 141, at 534. 
Judges often allowed these plea bargains, though they are empowered to reject them. See Stephen J. 
Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guidelines 
Circumvention in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1300 (1997).  
151 In some other jurisdictions, prosecutors need judicial permission to drop counts after the proceeding 
reached a certain stage (usually after the issuance of indictment or information). See LAFAVE, ISRAEL & 
KING, supra  note 8, §13.3(c). In these jurisdictions, judges have some power to restrain unwarranted charge 
bargains.  
152 See Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra  note 4, at 33 (“A particularly noxious form 
of dishonesty is overcharging by prosecutors--the filing of charges with the expectation that defendants will 
trade excess charges for a guilty plea.”); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining , supra  note 
2, at 85-105 (describing how prosecutors use overcharging in the plea bargaining process); Note, supra  note 
123, 293-94 (arguing that prosecutors’ use of overcharging increase sentence disparity); Gifford, supra  note 
25, at 47-48 (describing how prosecutors might charge the defendant with more serious offenses than those 
warranted by her case evaluation). 
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mislabeled because of tactical charge reduction. 153  Charge bargains, at least when they 
are not presented in open court, are not subject to public scrutiny. 154 The practice also 
results in more significant sentence disparity then sentence bargaining, a problematic 
phenomenon even if all defendants are guilty. 155  
For these reasons and others, many commentators have called for the abolition of 
charge bargaining.156 A comprehensive defense of a charge barga ining ban exceeds the 
scope of this Article. For my purpose it is sufficient to say that improving the efficacy of 
the partial ban is another reason to revisit the use of the practice.  
Whether charge bargaining would be totally prohibited or only restricted and 
subjected to courts’ review, the concern that prosecutors would find ways to continue to 
charge bargain on the sly always exists. But these concerns should not be overstated. 
Most prosecutors would not be willing to violate a clear cut rule that prohibits charge 
bargaining or prohibits concealing it from courts, even when they believe the rule 
restricts them too much. Prosecutors are bound by many rules that cannot be easily 
enforced, from disclosure rules to the prohibition on bribery; yet few are willing to act in 
clear violation of these rules.157 The main problem facing weak case defendants today is 
that prosecutors can induce them to plead guilty while being totally in conformity with 
                                                 
153 See Langbein, supra  note 2, at 16 (“In the plea bargaining that takes the form of charge bargaining (as 
opposed to sentence bargaining), the culprit is convicted not for what he did, but for something less 
opprobrious.”). See also  Alschuler, Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, supra  note 10, at 1141-42.  
154 See Wright & Miller, Honesty and Opacity, supra  note 142, at 1410-13 (arguing that, “the public cannot 
tell the difference between reasonable and unreasonable charge bargains” because the practice is not 
transparent).  
155 See Alschuler, Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra  note 25, at 658 (arguing that because of 
sentence disparity, plea negotiation is inherently unfair). 
156 See Wright & Miller, Honesty and Opacity, supra  note 142, Langbein, supra  note 2, at 16, Guidorizzi, 
supra  note 5, at 782, Alschuler, Trial Judges’s Role in Plea Bargaining, supra  note 10, at 1141-42. 
157 See Alschuler, Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, supra  note 4, at 962 (arguing that it is easier 
to curtail plea bargaining than to curtail bribery, because the prosecutor’s personal incentives to accept 
bribery are stronger and because courts can detect plea bargains more easily than bribery).   
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the existing legal rules. Even if a ban on charge bargaining would be circumvented from 
time to time, only an incurable cynic will argue that it would have no impact whatsoever. 
In fact, when plea bargaining was banned in different jurisdictions, prosecutors 
usually complied with the ban, as far as it went. For example, when Alaska introduced a 
total ban on plea bargaining, plea bargaining as an institution was substantially curtailed 
as long as policy makers were committed to the ban. 158 Similarly, a study of the plea 
bargaining ban in felony cases in El Paso, Texas also concluded that charge bargaining 
was practically abolished, with few authorized exceptions.159  
Moreover, the availability of sentence bargaining would ease most of the pressure 
to circumvent a ban on charge bargaining. While the experience of Alaska and El Paso 
shows that even a total ban on plea bargaining can be enforced, it is commonly agreed 
that a more selective ban is even more likely to succeed.160 In the partial ban system, 
most of the pressure to bargain could be shifted to the permitted sentence bargaining.  
To the extent that the risk of illegal charge bargaining is still substantial, one can 
consider additional measures to reduce it. A sentencing policy that relies more on the real 
offense rather then the charged one can discourage charge bargaining by limiting its 
                                                 
158 When the Attorney General of Alaska declared a ban on plea bargaining in 1975, most prosecutors 
resisted the move. See Teresa White Carns & John Kruse, A Re-evaluation of Alaska's Plea Bargaining 
Ban, 8 ALASKA L.REV. 27, 28 (1991). Yet, at least in the early year of the ban, when it was more strictly 
enforced, plea bargain ing was substantially curtailed. Id. at 33.   
159 See Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 35 
UCLA L. Rev. 265, 296 (1987). 
160 See Guidorizzi, supra note 5, at 772-82 (arguing that a total ban on plea bargaining is unsustainable in 
the long run, but with sentence incentives to guilty plea a ban can survive). Other studies also showed that 
when the defendant can enjoy some benefits from waiving their right to jury trial, a ban on charge 
bargaining is sustainable. See Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable? , supra note 5, at 1093-94 
(arguing, based on the experience of Philadelphia courts, that plea bargaining can be eliminated if 
defendants get sentence discount for electing a bench trial instead of a jury trial); Wright & Miller, 
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 4, at 79 (showing that an aggressive screening policy together 
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effect on the sentence.161 Internal prosecutorial guidelines and ethical rules can assist in 
preventing charge bargains, too.162 Courts can be instructed to ask the parties whether 
they reached any understanding about the charges, either after every guilty plea or 
whenever there are signals that a charge bargain might have been reached, like a guilty 
plea that followed charge reduction. Prosecutors and defense attorneys are unlikely to 
engage in an illegal practice knowing that later they would have to lie about it to the 
court.163  
Other, more comprehensive amendments to the plea bargaining process can 
reduce the risk even further.164 For example, Professor Schulhofer proposed to allow 
prosecutors to drop charges only until the defendant pleaded.165 Under this proposal, if 
the prosecutor dismissed some of the charges, the court would verify that the dismissal is 
not contingent on a guilty plea and then enter a cooling period of at least seven days 
before the defendant is allowed to plead guilty to the remaining charges. That way the 
defendant can retract from any illegal charge bargain without risking reinstatement of 
charges.  
                                                 
161 Under a real offense sentencing system, the court imposes sentence according to the real conduct of the 
offender rather then the charges for which he was convicted. When sentencing relies on “real offense” 
factors, the prosecutor’s charging decision has little importance. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
adopted a modified real offense scheme, that rely on charge related constrains while requiring the 
consideration of many factors that are not elements of the counts in determining the sentence. See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A, intro. cmt. n.4(a) (2005); Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense System, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1342, 1352-61 (1997) 
(explaining the modified real offense system).  
162 See Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 4, at 54 (suggesting reliance on 
prosecutorial guidelines and internal enforcement of these guidelines as a tool to curtail charge bargains).  
163 See Alschuler, Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, supra  note 4, at 963-64 (arguing that lawyers 
would not be willing to engage in illegal plea bargaining and later lie about it to the court). 
164 For few suggestions to assure that plea bargains would be fully supervised by courts, see Note, supra 
note 101, (suggesting a process where the Judge explicitly tell the defendant the sentence he should expect 
after trial and the pleading guilty discount); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of 
Prosecutor Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005), available at SSRN, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=658501 (suggesting that sentencing commissions insist that prosecutors draft for 
themselves some guidelines about their charging and disposition choices and then rely on judges to monitor 
prosecutors’ use of the guidelines).  
165 See Stephen J. Schulhofer,  Due Process in Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 788-89, 823-24 (1980). 
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The court might need to tell each defendant that the prosecutor cannot reinstate 
the charges if he does not plead guilty, in order to reduce the risk that the defense 
attorney will push the defendant to plead guilty against his interest. If prosecutors try to 
reinstate dropped charges or file new related charges, the court must question the parties 
to make sure that the prosecutor did not carry out an illegal threat to a defendant that 
retracted from a charge bargain. As a result, the prosecutor would not be able to sanction 
a defendant who breaches his promise to plead guilty and thus would not offer a charge 
bargain.  
Schulhofer’s suggestion is aimed to assure that charge bargains would not only be 
illegal, but also unenforceable. According to that proposal, if the prosecutor wants to 
reduce charges, she can only do so unconditionally. 
Note that, unlike charge bargaining, a unilateral charge reduction does not create 
an innocence problem – even when the defendant pleads guilty because of it. For 
example, if the prosecutor has an aggravated assault case in which the aggravating factors 
are hard to prove, she might unconditionally reduce the charge to simple assault. The 
resulting strong simple assault case can now be resolved through sentence bargaining. 
Yet, since the simple assault case is strong, this result is desirable.  
If, on the other hand, the simple assault case is also weak (for example, when the 
defendant has a potentially valid claim of self defense or mistaken identity) the defendant 
would refuse to plea bargain even after the charge was reduced. In such a case the 
defendant faces a simple assault charge, regardless of his plea. The limited difference 
between the post-trial sentence for simple assault and the post-plea sentence for the same 
offense cannot induce him to plead guilty, when the case against him is weak. 
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Consequently, a unilateral charge reduction cannot induce guilty pleas to weak charges. 
As a by product, a ban on charge bargaining discourages prosecutors from overcharging 
because piling up weak charges can only encourage defendants to elect a trial; it cannot 
induce them to plead guilty.  
One might be concerned that an effective ban on charge bargaining might lead to 
general sentence increase. In capital punishment cases this is an especially serious 
concern for those who believe that too many defendants are sentenced to death. 166 Yet, 
when prosecutors cannot bargain in the shadow of death they might refrain from issuing 
the death notice unilaterally, in order to be able to reach a sentence bargain. When 
defendants only face a sentence of life imprisonment, prosecutors are allowed to offer a 
sentence reduction in return for a guilty plea. When this is done often, fewer defendants 
would face death sentences. Thus, it is unclear whether a ban on charge bargaining would 
increase or decrease the sentences.  
Even in non-capital cases, legislation often allow prosecutors to secure extremely 
harsh sentences on defendants convicted at trial. Currently, prosecutors often reduce 
charges, or in other way reduce the sentence to which the defendant is exposed, when 
they believe that the prescribed sentence is much too severe. However, in the existing 
system they usually use such charge reduction to extract guilty pleas.167 Because they 
                                                 
166 For another view see Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The 
Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs , available at  SSRN, http://papers .ssrn.com/abstract=691447 (arguing that 
capital punishment is morally required because it prevents many more deaths than it causes).  
167 See Stuntz, Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, supra  note 55, at 2553-54 (arguing that prosecutors 
are often interested in milder sentences than the law prescribes, but they use the harsh post-trial sentence as 
a threat to extract guilty pleas); Wright, supra  note 10 (manuscript at 35, on file with author) (arguing that 
the federal law allows harsh sentences and thus the discounted sentence offered to defendant in weak cases 
is not very costly to the government); Frank O. Bowman III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion--Explaining 
Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1132-1133 (2001) (arguing 
that prosecutors often offer substantial concessions because they deem the prescribed guidelines sentence 
as very severe).  
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believe that the sentences defendants face are too harsh, they have no interest in their  
imposition even in strong cases. Hence, they offer similar plea bargains to lower charges 
in both weak and strong cases. But in order to dissuade defendants from going to trial, 
they do not offer any charge reduction to defendants that refuse to plead guilty. Since the 
sentence prescribed by law is so harsh and the plea bargain sentence is so much lighter, 
the offer is often an offer the defendant cannot refuse even if the case against him is 
weak. Consequently, almost all cases, weak and strong, are disposed through similar plea 
bargains.  
But with a ban on charge bargains and a partial ban on sentence bargains 
prosecutors would not be able to do so. If they believe charge reduction is needed to 
mitigate harsh sentences, they will have to offer this reduction to all defendants whether 
they are pleading guilty or not.168 This would allow defendants to stand trial without 
risking a sentence that even the prosecutor believes is much too harsh. In that case, the 
partial ban would not push post-plea sentences up, but rather push post-trial sentences 
down.  
In any event, legislators can always bypass any effect a partial ban would have on 
the severity of sentences by adopting new sentencing laws. The political question of the 
appropriate sentence severity is not at issue here; the partial ban can be equally 
incorporated in a more and less severe sentencing regime.  
                                                 
168 Professor Wright is concerned that a cap on sentence discounts would result in harsher sentences, and 
“this might be too high a price to pay for a more accurate system that values innocence.” Wright, supra 
note 10 (manuscript at 79, on file with author). Yet, if the prosecutor is not interested in the harsh sentences 
she currently threatens to impose on defendants who reject plea bargain offers, then this risk is not 
substantial. Unable to selectively impose the severe sentences only on defendants who plead not guilty, the 
prosecutor is likely to charge all defendants with the reduced charges. Therefore, when the partial ban 
restricts the difference between post-plea and post trial sentence, it is more likely to drive the post-trial 
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An important point of these examples is that the partial ban is effective even if 
prosecutors have the power to substantially reduce the defendants’ sentence, as long as 
most of this sentence reduction is unconditional. A large sentence reduction does not 
undermine the partial ban – only a large difference between post-trial and post-plea 
sentences does. 
A more substantial challenge to the partial ban is posed by the need to induce 
defendants to cooperate. Prosecutors’ power to offer leniency is sometimes used to elicit 
defendants’ assistance in investigations and prosecutions of other defendants. If charge 
bargaining and other legal tools that allow exceedingly lenient sentences are prohibited, 
prosecutors’ ability to elicit cooperation would be undermined. Any attempt to 
accommodate a partial ban and cooperation agreements would probably require a 
compromise. There are at least three alternative ways to address this issue, each 
representing a different balance between the conflicting interests of the partial ban and 
cooperation agreements.  
The first approach, which gives full weight to the need to encourage cooperation, 
restricts the partial ban to non-cooperation cases. In order to assure that prosecutors do 
not abuse this power to circumvent the partial ban in other cases, the parties to a 
cooperation agreement should be required to persuade the court that the defendant 
supplied assistance significant enough to justify the large sentence discount.  
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines adopted a version of that approach in the 
“substantial assistance” rule.169 Yet, the Guidelines’ application notes instruct the court to 
                                                 
169 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2005) (authorizing courts to depart from the 
Guidelines when the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 
another person). 
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give substantial weight to the government evaluation of the defendant’s assistance.170 In 
order to assure that the cooperation term would not be used to circumvent the partial ban 
when the defendant did not supply substantial assistance, the court must be instructed to 
question the parties for their motives. That way the risk of circumventing the partial ban 
would be restricted to cooperation cases.  
A second approach, which gives slightly more weight to the need to protect the 
innocent, would require prosecutors to separate the cooperation discount from the guilty 
plea discount. In such a system, the defendant’s cooperation agreement would include 
one section detailing the discount for cooperation, and another one detailing the sentence 
concession for the guilty plea. After the defendant fully cooperated, the cooperation 
discount would be granted to him, either by an irreversible charge reduction or by a 
court’s ruling that a certain sentence discount will be granted. Only then, when the 
cooperation discount is secured, would he be required to enter a plea; or, if he already 
pleaded guilty, he would then be allowed to reconsider his plea. If he pleads guilty at this 
stage, his sentence would be further reduced by the guilty plea discount.  
Even though this additional sentence concession is limited by the partial ban, 
most defendants would still plead guilty, because after cooperating, the case against them 
is likely to be sufficiently strong. In fact, even some innocent defendants would probably 
believe that their chance at trial is too low after they have cooperated and admitted guilt. 
Yet, in a few cases, an innocent defendant might be able to show the jury that he lied 
under prosecutorial pressure. In these rare cases, the innocent defendant might be willing 
to risk going to trial when, in doing so, he only risks a part of the sentence discount he 
received. Knowing this, prosecutors would have additional incentives to make sure that 
                                                 
170 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2005) comment n.3 (2005). 
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the information the defendant supplied is well corroborated or that its credibility can be 
otherwise shown, before they rely on it.  
While this approach might better protect innocent defendants, it might also raise 
concerns that prosecutors would too often be unable to prove that the cooperator’s 
version is reliable, and thus defendants would too often be acquitted at trial after 
cooperating. That would not only allow them to escape conviction, but might also benefit 
the other defendants they helped convict. On the other hand, if one is more concerned 
that cooperation agreements too often produce unreliable evidence, this approach might 
be preferred.171  
A third and more sweeping reform would give full weight to the need to protect 
the innocent. Under such an approach, cooperation agreements should be restricted like 
other plea agreements and not result in exceedingly lenient bargains. Since the partial ban 
still allows many plea concessions, prosecutors would still be able to induce defendants 
to cooperate when the available concessions are limited. For example, the average 
sentence discount for cooperation in the federal system is about 50%.172 This and even a 
                                                 
171 Currently, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines leave the final decision regarding the size of the reward for 
cooperation in the hands of the judge. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2005). In 
practice, the prosecutor has a substantial influence on the reward. Yet, by vesting the power to grant the 
reward in the hands of the judge, prosecutors gain two important advantages. First, the reward is only 
determined after the cooperator fulfilled his part, and thus can be adjusted to the level and quality of 
cooperation. Second, when the cooperator testifies against another defendant he can truthfully claim that 
the prosecutor did not promise him a certain sentence discount, and that his sentence relies in the hands of 
the judge. That makes his testimony seems more reliable. See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 
OHIO ST . L. J. 69, 94-97 (1995). Yet, these advantages to the prosecutor might be considered as 
disadvantages by those who believe that cooperating defendants are too often lying in return for substantial 
leniency. If this concern is justified, it might be wrong to leave the jury with the impression that the reward 
is uncertain and therefore the testimony is more likely to be true. 
172 See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 21 (2003). 
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slightly higher discount are still permissible according to the standard of review that is 
suggested here.173  
Only in a minority of cases, where the prosecutor is required to offer more in 
return for cooperation will the partial ban restrict her. Even then, she can still elicit 
cooperation by offering to drop all charges against the cooperator. Unlike exceedingly 
lenient bargains, a dismissal of a case cannot result in wrongful conviction of the 
defendant. Such an approach would probably be preferred if policy makers fear that 
cooperation agreements are too often used to circumvent the partial ban and elicit a guilty 
plea from innocent defendants.  
I will not try to compare the costs and benefits of each approach here, although I 
believe that the first approach, which does not burden prosecutors’ ability to extract 
cooperation, is the only one that is politically feasible. Even with this approach the partial 
ban can play an important role in alleviating the innocence problem.  
 
V. Conclusions  
For years lawyers have struggled with the need to restrict prosecutors’ charging 
decisions. When nineteen out of twenty convictions result from a guilty plea, and only 
few defendants acquitted at trial, prosecutors’ charging decisions become the single most 
important factor in allocating convictions. Currently grand juries and preliminary 
hearings are supposed to prevent unfounded prosecutions. Yet, grand juries are easily 
controlled by prosecutors, and judges in preliminary hearings cannot effectively review 
the strength of the case without conducting a costly mini-trial before the real trial. Thus, 
                                                 
173 See supra Section IV.B.  
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not surprisingly few students of criminal justice regard these processes as effective 
barriers against unestablished charges.  
The cheapest and most effective way to discourage the prosecution of weak cases 
is to rely on the prosecutors’ estimation of the case. Of course, if the aim is to control 
prosecutorial discretion, one cannot simply rely on their asserted evaluation of the 
evidence. But by using the links between plea bargains and charging policies, the 
prosecutor’s real evaluation of the case can be revealed. Since a substantial plea bargain 
concession signals weakness in the case, the partial ban can discourage prosecutors from 
bringing unsupported charges in a cheaper and more effective way then preliminary 
hearings or grand juries. Instead of ignoring the interrelation between plea bargaining and 
prosecuting policies, we should use it to effectively control prosecutorial discretion. 
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